



ANNUAL ACCRUED EXPENDITURE BUDGETING















United States Coest Guard Academy
A thesis submitted to the Faculty of the School of Government,
Business, and International Affairs of The George Washington
University in partial satisfaction of the requirements
for the decree of Master of Business Administration
June 7, 1961
Thesis directed by
Arlin Rex Johnson, Ph.D.
Professor of Business Administration
G>Vt>
'M




As the only U. S, Coast Guard officer in the 1961 Class
of the Navy Graduate Comptrollership Program, I became inter-
ested in the Coast Guard's experience with the accrued expendi-
ture method of budgeting and aDproprlating, the only armed
service to be so involved.
Despite the evident possibility that the accrued
expenditure principle may lapse as effective legislation within
a year, and some day be remembered only as one of the many
concepts designed to improve the budgeting and appropriating
procedures which are at any one instance present in the Federal
government, the tremendous support which the concept built up
in such a relatively short period, and the controversy involved
in its eventual enactment into legislation, led me to attempt
to trace its development from beginning to now.
Whether or not the accrued expenditure method is a
dead issue, writing this paper enabled me to benefit from a
comprehensive study of the present Federal budgeting procedures.
Acknowledgment for technical assistance is gratefully
made to CDR Robert T. LoForte, USCG, Marvin P. Hopkins, and
Leo W. Well, all of the Budget and Cost Analysis Division,
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The exercise of the spending power as a function of
Congress requires a great amount of careful study and analysis.
At the very "heart of the spending power is the appropriation
process, although we cannot ignore the over-all picture of
making federal expenditures,'
This paper deals with the consideration, study, debate,
and ultimate passage of legislation which contemplated placing
a limitation on spending, more specifically, annual accrued
expenditures, of agencies within the executive branch of the
Government. "The enactment of Public Law 85-759 » approved
August 25, 1958, climaxed one of the most controversial pieces
of legislation on budget and accounting in many years." 2 The
version of the accrued expenditure principle which was eventual-
ly enacted was a compromise of the original recommendation
proposed by the Commission on Organization of the Executive
Branch of the Government, perhaps better known as the Second
Robert Ash Wallace, Congressional Control of Federal
Spending (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, I960), p. 4,
2
U. S,, Congress, Senate, Committee on Government
Operations, Financial Management In the Federal Government.
8oth Cong. , 2d~Sess., December 30, i960 (Washington: 0. S.
Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 98.

2Hoover Commission.
Although to date there has been no complete implementa-
tion of the accrued expenditure concept, this paper traces the
attempts toward full usage as far as they have been oermitted
by the Congress to materialize. Inasmuch as the law permitting
limitations to be placed on annual accrued expenditures expires
on April 1, 1962, an evaluation la made of the future implica-
tions of that principle.
The Spending Process
One of the leading authorities on Congress, i)r. George
Galloway, estimates that "perhaps nine-tenths of the work of
Congress is concerned, directly or indirectly, with the
spending of public money. M3
The federal spending process "begins with the back-
ground of authorizing legislation on the statute books. It
then proceeds through four phases: budget preparation, budget
,.4
authorisation, budget execution, and budget review. It is
emphasized that the word "budget" appears In the description
for each of the four phases.
Wallace continues: "But currently the moet vexing
problems appear to arise during the period of budget authoriza-
tion—the time of congressional consideration and enactment
of appropriation bills." It is the period of budget authori-
zation with which this discussion of the accrued expenditure
.
1 | n
--|- |.— .- m ^ |M - ---Mm- -mi mi i (i an- n hi a,, hi - i ani in i !' iim mi mi— Mini n— ii— nnrwwW r- nr
^Wallace, Congressional Control . . . . p. 3.
4
Ibid ., p. 4.
5Ibid.

principle is mostly concerned, although the complete accrued
expenditures system and method affect the other three phases of
the spending process, as well.
The Federal Budget
In the preparation of the budget ''lies not only the
control of departmental expenditures but the nower to insist on
efficient methods of management in the spending agencies."
However, neither the Congress nor the President has
achieved the control that they have desired over the expenditure
of appropriated funds.
The Congress itself has had difficulty in controlling
the departments and has been unwilling to give the President
the power to do so. Appropriations generally are made dir-
ectly to the departments rather than to the President;
and in practice it is extremely difficult for him to require
departmental conformity with his decision on the use of
appropriations. The main inducement to such conformity
lies in the fact that non-conformity may be penalized in
the future.
7
The Federal budget is concerned with three main
categories;
. . . expenditures, appropriations, and revenues, rather
than merely expenditures and revenues. This division
is a perpetual source of practical difficulty as well as
popular confusion. From the viewpoint of the budget's
economic impact during the ensuing year, the President
and the Congress are properly concerned with the relation
of expenditures to revenues. On the other hand, the
President recommends and the Congress enacts appropriations
°U. S., Commission on Organization of the Executive
Branch of the Government, Budget and Accounting t A Report to
the Congress. June 1955 (.Washington: U. £. Government Printing
Office, 1955), p. ix.
'Arthur Smithies, The Budgetary Process in the United
States (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1955), pp. 148-49.
•
which give the agencies the authority to spend, although
they may not be closely related to expenditures in the
year for which they are made."
The budget of the United States, as submitted to
Congress, in reality is two documents in one. First, it
states the amount of revenues estimated to be received
and the amount anticipated to be expended during the
fiscal year. Second, it authorizes the various agencies
of the government to operate for the fiscal year and
sets the amounts for which they may obligate the Treasury
in carrying forward their urograms.
9
Congress is required to take action each year upon only
the second, or authorization, portion. This paper is concerned
with the role .'ongress would play in setting not only the
amounts which agencies may obligate in conducting their opera-
tions and carrying forward programs, but with the setting also
of limitations upon the amount of expenditures (or spending on
a "checks issued" basis) which the agencies might effect in
liquidating prior obligations.
although the budget is submitted to the Congress annual-
ly by the President, and is acted upon annually by the Congress,
"there its annual character ceases."
Purportedly it is a budget for a particular fiscal
year and is thought of as representing the cost of
operation of the government during that year, but it is
not that simple. It includes funds for the completion
of projects end programs begun in previous fiscal years;
for the payment of items due because of the operation
of laws authorizing agencies to carry on activities
that are not related to any fiscal year, except as it
may be possible to compute the cost thereof for the
year; and for the beginning of projects that may take
8 Ibid. , pp. 102-103.
vGeorge Y. Harvey, Contract Authorization in the
Federal Budget procedure, Public Administration Review
,




The essence of the foregoing appears ad_ infinitum
throughout a study of the accrued expenditure concept integrated
into an annual b^sis. The very existence of programs which
cannot be completed for several years, let alone a single year,
seriously complicates a system of budget authorization predi-
cated upon an annual appropriation.
Spending Authority Terminology
Spending authority can be grouped into the "three
categories of spending, lending, and contract authority. . . .
Each agenoy may be said to have a 'tank' of spending, lending,
or contracting authority, but the level at which (each) i S kept
varies widely.''12
In all, Congress usee ten different kinds of spending
authority:
1. Ordinary current appropriations, including one-year,
multiple-year, and no-year appropriations.
2. Annual indefinite appropriations.
3. Permanent appropriations: definite and indefinite.
4. Contract authorizations, which confer authority to
enter into contracts and incur other obligations in
advance of an appropriation: current and permanent.
5. Appropriations to liquidate contract authorizations.
6. Authorizations to expend from public debt receipts.
7. Authorizations to make loans out of the Treasury.
8. Reappropriations.
9. Reauthorizations of contract authority.
10. Reauthorizations to expend from public debt receipts. ^
Smithies states "public comprehension of the budget
is greatly hampered by its bewildering terminology.'
11 Ibid.




Smithies, The Budgetary Process . ,.,,., o. 190.
..
On the expenditure side, the terms appropriation,
obligation, and expenditure cannot be avoided and are
confusing enough. There is no need to complicate things
further by using reappropriations, contract authorizations,
appropriations to liquidate contract authorizations, and
authorizations to expend from public-debt receipts—all
embraced by the hideous term "new obligational authority. "15
It is beyond the scope of this paper to explain or
defend the labyrinth of terminology used in connection with the
budget and the spending power. However, terms are defined and
explained insofar as is practicable when they are involved with
the accrued exoenditure principle.
Earlier Recommendations for Expenditure
Limitations
In 1952, the House of Representatives made an unsuccess-
ful attempt through the Coudert Resolution to impose a ceiling
on expenditures.
The failure of the Congress to control expenditures in
a particular year through appropriations for that year
has led to repeated assertions that there is something
inherently wrong with the system and that Congressional
control would be strengthened if the budget were placed
on a strictly annual basis so that appropriations made
for t given year had to be both obligated and spent in
that year. 17
During the same year, a congressional attempt was made
by means of the Smith amendment to exercise greater control
over the Defense Department appropriation by the imposition of
a ceiling on the actual amounts to be expended by that depart-
ment in fiscal year 1953.
^Ibld.




Giving loud and vocal claims to its prerogatives and
the fear that purse control was slipping away, the
House passed the ceiling amendment in en attempt to
regain control over a huge backlog of unspent funds
—
about $57,000,000 (Fie—actually should be •- 57 , 000 , 000 , 000| .
The -j.nendnjent wss oassed amidst warnings by Rep. John
Vorys of
"a threat of a military dictatorship over the
economy of our country by permitting the military
to have the possibility of spending '103,000,000,000
in one year, if they so desire. This amendment will
return to the- Congress the responsibility they
should carry out of deciding upon expenditures."1"
However, the Senate followed the recommendations of its
Appropriations Committee and omitted the expenditure ceiling.
The ceiling was likewise omitted in conference, "probably under
the pressure of military leaders and the Administration." 1 ^
Hac? Congress Imposed the ceilin?- amendment, there
is no doubt but that it could have controlled the
amounts to be expended by the Department of Defense.
But it seems almost certain that it had no real idea
of what the consecuenees of taking such action would
have been because of the limitations of the information
made available to it. 20
Tn January 1954, a proposal for the use of an expendi-
ture budget was made to the Bureau of the Bud ret by a group of
professional accountants who had studied the problem. 21
;"lso, in 1954, the Coor-er committee of the Senate in
its report on Financial Management in the Department of Defense,
October 1954, stated:
•Wallace, Congressional Control . . .
. p. 79.
19 Ibid., p. 81.
20 Ibid.
21
Commission on Organization . . ., Budget e nd
Accounting . . , p. 2^.

8However, In order to gain the maximum benefits
from budgeting and accounting on a cost basis, the
Committee suggests that consideration be given to a
basis of appropriating that would be more closely-
related to costs In the sense of goods and services
received than the basis now used. Although some
provision for congressional authorization to contract
for long lead time c. o. d. orders would be needed,
the cost approach would focus attention on the resources
to be received and those to be used in the budget year. 22
Second Hoover Commission
Included in Fart IV of Its report on budget and account-
ing to Congress, entitled "Restoration of Congressional Control
of the Purse," the Second Hoover Commission submitted as
Recommendation No, 7* "That the executive budget and congress-
ional appropriations be in terms of estimated annual accrued
expenditures, namely, charges for the cost of goods and
services estimated to be received. -^ In all, that report
contained 25 separate recommendations relating to budget and
accounting. The Commission's Task Force on Budget and Account-
ing had, in its report to the parent body, included the annual
accrued expenditure concept as its Recommendation No. 11, of an
24
overall total of 29 recommendations.
In its analysis of the Budget and Accounting Report,
the Executive Office of the President listed the Second Hoover
Commission's principal recommendations as calling for:
22 Ibld .
23 Ibid.. p. 25.
24
U. S., Commission on Organization of the Executive
Branch of the Government, Task Force Report on Budget and
Accounting in the United States government
. June 1955(Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 40.

(a) continued use of performance budgeting, (b) formula-
tion and administration of agency budgets on a cost
basis, (c) appropriations based on accrued expenditures,
and (d) authorization for limited periods of continuing
Government programs not susceptible to the usual budget
controls, ^5
Percy Rappaport, Assistant Director, Bureau of the
Budget, stated before the House Subcommittee on Executive and
Legislative Reorganization, during the conduct of early hearings
on legislation to implement the objectives of the Second Hoover
Commission:
... we are especially interested in three things:
1, accrual accounting; 2, cost-based budgeting; and
3, appropriations on accrued-expenditure basis.
These are the three things that we are primarily
Interested in and we think they are the important
substance of the Hoover Commission report. 26
Former Senator John F. Kennedy, an active proponent of
the accrued expenditure principle, and sponsor of legislation
originating in the Senate to enact it into the Government's
appropriation procedure, was quoted as saying that he regarded
that provision as "the very heart of the (Hoover) Commission's
highly commended revision of our complicated financial struc-
ture." 27
25
"TJ. S., Executive Office of the President, Bureau of
the Budget, Improvement of Financial Management in the Federal
Government . October 19p^ (Washington: U. S. Government Printing
Office, 1956), p. 21.
2




on Government Operations, Hearings, Bills to Improve Governmental
Budgeting and Accounting Methods ," 84th Cong.. 2d Sees.. 1956.
'U. S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Reorganization
of the Committee on Government Operation^ Hearing. Bills to
Provide for Improved Methods of Stating Budget Estimates
,
85th Cong., 1st Sess., 1957, p. 12.

10
The Executive Office analysis further elaborated:
Appropriations are now made in terms of obligations,
with amounts appropriated serving as a limit on goods
and services to be ordered; whereas the Commission
favored appropriation of amounts covering goods and
services to be received ench year, with supplementary
congressional authorization and limitation for long
lead-time programs as required. 28
That implementation of the Hoover Commission recommenda-
tion was of necessity to be long-range in character can be
readily seen from the Commission f s statement that h adoption of
this proposal will require administrative change in the Govern-
ment's budgeting and accounting procedures, particularly in the
Department of Defense, and will require education of those




In arriving at its recommendations, the Task Force on
Budget and Accounting drew much of its data from an investiga-
tion by the Comptroller General of the United States made at
the request of the House Committee on Appropriations In 195^.^°
What Annual Accrued Expenditures Means
In its simplest terms, annual accrued expenditures means
stating appropriations on the basis of goods and services
expected to be received during the year regardless of when
obligated for, or when used, or when paid for.
The obligation basis is 'related to the accrued
Executive Office of the President, Improvement of
Financial . . . . p. 23.
^Commission on Organization . . ., Budget and
Accounting. . . . , p. 25.




expenditure basis through a simple formula, as follows:
Obligations incurred equal accrued expenditures plus the increase
in contracts and orders or legal commitments outstanding during
the period or less a decrease. "31
The accrual of expenditures "differs from the incurral
of obligations, when it differs at all, in coming at a later
point in the process of the Government's procurement. "^2
Expenditures accrue "when goods and services are received, or
generally, when title passes to the Government. Accrual
includes the occasions when performance on a contract is
accepted for the purpose of progress payments that are made
before the completion of the entire job.
*"
(Reference matter of this paper contains a more
elaborate definition of annual accrued expenditures, anc shows
how they can be derived mathematically.)-^
^House Committee on Government Operations, Bills to
Improve . . . Hearings , 1956, p. 152. (See Appendix II for
complete and expanded formula.
)






ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE ANNUAL
ACCRUED EXPENDITURE METHOD
It is the purpose of this chapter to present and
evaluate insofar ss is possible all of the most pertinent
arguments for and against the annual accrued expenditure
principle. Neither pro nor con is stressed at the sacrifice
of the other. The reader is free to draw his own conclusions,
keening in mind that the question is never isolated from
controversy.
Budget Review
Perhaps the bulk of the discussion surrounding the
Hoover Commission recommendation for annual accrued expenditure
appropriating and budgeting concerned review of the President's
budget by Congress during the authorization stage. The subject
of review is very much related to the subsequent section on
congressional control of the budget and the "power of the
purse.
"
Proponents of the method generally agreed that the
whole Congress has continually encountered difficulty "in
determining, with respect to any individual budget, the actual
expenditures during the year, the appropriation for the year,




appropriations carried forward from preceding years . "•*• That
group felt that the accrued expend iture procedure would
synthesize and simplify that problem.
However, the two Appropriations Committees members,
those probably most familiar with the intricacies of the
Federal budget, seemed satisfied with the present picture that
was derived from the budget presentation. The Chairman of the
Senate Appropriations Committee stated;
Information on obligations and expenditures for
a 3-year period are presently included in the budget
submissions made to the Congress on each appropriation
item. The Appropriations Committee, in their annual
hearings, inquire searchingly into the expenditure of
previous funds, the existence of unused balances and
reasons therefor, and the need for additional funds,
as a basis for arriving at the amount of new appro-
priations that may be required for each program or
item. The Committee on .Appropriations of the House
of Representatives, consisting of 50 members who have
no other committee assignments requiring their attention,
performs an excellent service by careful inquiry as to
the need for every item of expenditure recommended in
the President's budget.
^
The Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Defense
Department Appropriations summarized: 'The expenditure basis
here in this budget shows exactly what is being spent each
ye=>r. It shows what is carried over from previous years, what
U. S., Congress, Senate, committee on Appropriations,
Hearings, Bills to Provide for Improved Methods of Stating
Budge t Estimates and ^Estimates for Deficiency and Supplemental
ApproPrlationiT^5W Cong. , 2d Sess. ,""1953, p." 9l.
'-U. v., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations,
Providing for Improved Methods of Stating Budget Estimates ,




total obligations are. "3
But, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
believed that somewhere between the two extremes was more
accurate when he said:
It is unlikely that rrore Informative might be available
under a system calling for aa accrued expenditure
limitation, althouf-h, as indicated in the testimony
of the Bureau of the Budget, perhaps s wore detailed
examination of the available information might be
required .4
Referring to a more orderly review of the budget,
the General Accounting Office believed;
. . .
that while many procedures have been built
into the budget review process which are designed
to review carryover authority and long leadtirne
programs and not withstanding the efforts that have
been Bade, accrued expenditure appropriations will
provide an orderly and logical basis for such a
review and will place the operation in a regular
channel through consideration of accrued expenditure
appropriations as part of the regular budget process,
both in the executive branch and in the Congress.
5
In reminding that once an appropriation has been made
for -3 particular puroose, and that money can be spent without
any further positive review by Congress, the .Acting Director,
Bureau of the Budget stated that the accrued expenditure method
^U. S. , Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Committee
on Government Operations, Hearings, Bills to Improve Federal
gystem of Budgeting and Making Appropriations
. 85th Cong.,
1st Sess., 1957, p. 205."
^Senate Committee on Appropriation* , Bills to Provide
. . . , Hearings . 1958, p. 123.
n&« S. , Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Committee
on Government Operations, Hearin gs, Bills to Improve govern-






would provide a "mandatory review by the entire Congress of the
program changes which have been made of the unobligated
balances which remain, and the use to which it is oroposed
they be put." 6
The significant ooint to be emphasized here is that
the proponents of the method, while admitting that the Appro-
priations Committees perform a review of the means to which
previously appropriated money has been put, believed the
accrued expenditure method would automatically provide a
systematic annual presentation of the agency financial plans,
showing past performance and forward planning.
The Chairman of the Hoover Commission Task Force on
Budget and Accounting thought the recommended procedure would
"give the Congress a storehouse of information which it does
not now have and which T cannot understand how it can obtain
readily except by some frontal attack on the problem, by
requiring that agencies come back to Congress for the money.
The last portion of his statement referred to coming back to
Congress for authority to expend previously appropriated monies
At least two members of Congress felt the procedures
of review were Inadequate:
There is no obligation for the legislatjre to review,
and the review is often not made in great detail.
It is easy to say simply "We went over all that last
year, let's not bother with it again* * On the other
P! ——*—> II Mil I 'IIM»^^WWWW»<^|PIIBI< lll»JI 111 !!!—>««»»»M I H»WW—WWWWW—»<»^»<—W— III IM I II I — ————»
Senate Committee on Aooropriatione , Bills to Provide
. .--» , Hearings , 1956, p. 10',.
House Committee on Government Operations, Bills to
rove . . . , Hf"rt njgf , 1957, p. 11*.
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hand, If the Congress each year has to prescribe
a certain amount of money to continue a project, it
is much more likely to ask whether the project is
being carried out as efficiently as possible, or even
whether the project is worth continuing. The Congress
would be forced to take positive action pegged to a
soecific sum of money, instead of Just acquiescing in
the continued spending of money already appropriated.
8
The Appropriations Committee position, in support of
the present review procedure, was that:
... we find out how much you have spent, what did you
spend it for, did you carry out the purpose which you
said you would carry out, have you fulfilled your
obligations to Congress in the assurances you have
given, what progress have you made?
Then we have procurement and other investigations.
We had one last year. We have one this year, when we
go out and we kind of see what actually happened from
our standpoint, because we want not only their word,
but we want a look-see of our own, . • • and of course,
... we get the GrAO reports all the time.
9
In answering whether the accrued expenditure method
might obscure the total cost of a program, especially with the
method providing contracting authority for long lead-time items,
and thereby ineffectuate review, the Comptroller General stated:
I do not think it would obscure cost of a program.
... I think the entire program would be before the
appropriate legislative committees and the Appropriations
Committees and, therefore, before the Congress as a
whole and they could very well watch the program as
it progresses. I might point out that under the present
system, as you know, the overruns on contracts have been
enormous in many areas, so that the present arrangement
doesn't always tell the story as to what a program is
ultimately going to cost. 10
8 Ibid ., p. 52.
9 Ibid ., p. 155.
U. S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Reorganization
of the Committee on Government Operations, Hearing, on Bills
to Provide for Improved Methods of Stating Budget Estimates .
85th Cong., 1st Sess., 1957, p. 29.
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One Congressman envisioned the Appropriations Commit-
tees, under the proposed procedure, as being able to
"accelerate, decelerate, or stop the rate at which the program
is scheduled" 11 by having been shown total estimated costs and
the planned program showing financing required. In other words,
the committees each year would be equipped to make a decision
on the scope of work to be performed each year.
Dr. Gerhard Colm, of the National Planning Association,
while generally critical of the concept, considered the prin-
ciple of the annual review of all items in the budget a desir-
able feature of the accrued expenditure proposal:
After we had 1 year's experience with such a long-
range project on missiles, then Congress should be
given a reappraisal by the executive department and
should, if necessary, modify the original action,
irrespective whether that was contract authorization
under the new proposal, or an appropriation, as it
is at present. 12
Criticism of the present process as being concerned
only with new authority, rather than performance, reprogramming,
or rebudgeting was brought out.
Congress now is asked to pass unon tremendous
long-range programs merely on the basis of initial
estimates of total cost of an entire program.
Where appropriations are inadequate to complete
a program, Congress provides supplementary appropriations
to take care of the situation but where budget estimates
are high, there is no formal machinery whereby the
situation regularly comes up for review and correction
by Congress. 13
^U. S. , Congressional Record
. 85th Cong., 2d Sess.,
1958, CIV, Part 14, 17651.
"House Committee on Government Operations, Bills to
Improve . . . . Hearing . 1957 » p. 235.
-'Senate Committee on Appropriations, Bills to Provide
. .
.
, Hearings, 1958, p. 141.
.
18
The Director of the Bureau of the Budget gave the
following comparison of the present and proposed systems with
respect to review:
. . . the obligation budget highlights the ordering
of goods and services for a program—the beginning
of the financial process. The accrued expenditure
budget brings out for review the complete financial
cycle—from ordering the goods and services, through
the receipt of them (which establishes the liability
to disburse funds from the Treasury), to their appli-
cation to the program. In doing so, it provides
control on both the commitment and expenditure of
funds--the latter In terms of the goods and services
received. 14
It (accrued expenditure method] would enable more
effective review because the budget request would show:
(1) The estimated cost of what Is planned to be
done in the budget year as well as the toal
estimated cost of a project;
(2) The proposed use of resources such as
inventories that the agency has on hand;
(3) The value of resources carried over for use
in subsequent years;
(4) The goods and services to be received in the
budget year;
(5) The obligating authority needed to contract
for deliveries in subsequent years.
These kinds of information would be brought out
by the financial plan for each program that would
highlight past performance in relation to future plans. **
In contrast the obligation budget
• . . shows only the obi ideational requirements needed
to cover the goods and services to be ordered in the
budget ye*r in the case of annual appropriations, or
in the case of no-year appropriations, the goods and
services to be ordered either in the budget year or in
subsequent years. It does not reflect the use of
inventories or the balance of resources on hand at the
beginning and end of the year. It permits the buildup
of appropriation balances and provides control only on
14
U. S. , Congress, House, Committee on G-overnment
Operations, Providing for Improved Methods of Stating Budget
'Estimates ancTTiiBtlmates for beflclency and Supplemental
Appropriations
.
&5th Con?.. 1st Sess., 1957, H. Kept. 572 to
accompany H. R. 8002, p. 9.
15 Ibld., p. 8.

19
the commitment of funds. 1°
The Assistant Comptroller General testified that
furnishing cost data to Congress ''would be greatly enhanced by
teaming up the cost-based budget with the proposal for stating
appropriations on an accrued expenditure basis. . . . This
would provide the best opportunity for improved correlation of
programming, budgeting, and accounting." 1 ' This would be be-
cause of the emphasis placed on total resources to be consumed
and the extent of resources already available by the cost-based
budget.
Cost budgets, teamed with appropriations on an accrued
expenditure basis, said the Comptroller General, "would require
a type of continuing budget presentation that would bring out
the adequacy of management planning or the lack of it and give
the Congress an opportunity to have voice in setting the level
1 ft
of operations from year to year.
This combination would also "be a means for promoting
more cost consciousness and for focusing attention clearly on
the work to be done in the budget year and the cost of the work.
It would take into consideration the changes in inventory levels
and other resources between the beginning and the end of the
year.*' 19
l6 Ibld.
•'House Committee on Government Operations, Bills to




. , p. 165.

20
)t only the Congress, but the public, also, it was
claimed would be permitted a more complete and meaningful
understanding of the financial operations of the Government.
"
20
With reference to congressional review of long programs,
it was maintained by many that ' : the Congress may review the
performance and status of oast programs without changing the
basis of appropriations, and if it considers programs no longer
justified, it «ay rescind appropriations even to the point of
requiring contract terminations or cutbacks.
While agreeing that Congress does have such authority,
that is, to rescind funds or cancel appropriations, the
proponents claimed it was rarely done.
The House Committee on Appropriations stated
:
Of course, under present procedures the Congress,
if it later changes its mind, can take action to rescind
funds or repeal the authorization. Moreover, if the
ultimate cost proves to be less than the funds provided
the unused portion can be canceled or applied to other
purposes, and this is frequently done. 22
Thus, the Appropriations Committee indicated cancella-
tion of authorizations of funds was frequently done only in
event of corn-Dieted programs, Involving unused money. The
accrued expenditure method was supposed to provide automatic
annual review, and thereby look ahead in positively appropriat-
ing additional funds necessary for the next year, instead of,
20Ibld .. p. 113.
21 lbId., p. 157.
"U. S. , Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations,
Administration Plr-n to Improve Congressional Control of the
Budget , o'5th Cong.', 1st Sess. , 1957, H. Rept. 216, p. 8.
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as claimed, looking back as under the present system and
negatively considering cancellations of funds previously
authorized
.
In this section on review of the budget, there has
been discussion of "teaming" the cost-based budget with annual
accrued expenditure appropriations, and of the reported advan-
tages of such a procedure. It must be borne in mind that many
of the benefits claimed by proponents of the accrued expenditure
system with respect to budget review by Congress, would also be
available to that legislative body if cost-based budgets were
used within the presently existing obligations basis of
appropriating. That is, the accrued expenditure base of
appropriating would not have to be imposed in order to obtain
many of the review reforms which were advocated, provided cost-
based budgets based on accrual accounting were utilized.
Improved Congres s lonal Control
—
wPower of the Purge "
Two broad objectives which legislation in favor of
annual accrued expenditures was designee! to accomplish, in the
words of one of the authors, were: "(1) Improve financial
administration in the executive branch, ?nd (2) substantially
strengthen congressional control over the financial affairs of
the Federal Government. "^3
The Director of the Bureau of the Budget said it would
enable more effective control because:
^Kouse Committee on Government Ooer-tlons, Bills to
Improve . . . , lies rings , 1956, p. 115.
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(1) Annual appropriation action would be taken on
both the agency proposed programs and those underway;
(2) Appropriation carryovers would be greatly
reduced or eliminated and balances of contract authority
would either be reviewed or expire and be reapproved each
year;
(3) Congressional appropriation action would be more
directly related to the budget cash surplus or deficit, 24
The Chairman of the Hoover Commission Task Force said
it was his opinion that the proposed method "would strengthen
congressional control because today appropriations in terms of
obligations have become very nebulous, "^5
Former Senator Kennedy said:
It changes the method of stating budget estimates to give
both the executive department and the Congress a better
understanding and control of expenditures. When adopted
(E, R. 800]j?|
t the budget will become a modern accounting
device—a useful tool to control expenditures. It will
no longer be an antiquated system whose purpose seems to
be to deny information and supervision to the responsible
authorities. 26
In floor debate in the House, it was said that the bill
"constitutes much more than a mere bookkeeping device. This
legislation provides a financial tool, a means of supplying
some realistic Congressional control over the annual rate of
Government expenditures, . . , ,,27
Although it was understandable that because of the
24House Committee on Government Operations, H. Rept.
572, 1957, p. 8.
25House Committee on Government Operations, Bills to
Improve . . . . Hearings , 1956, p. 97.
?6
""Senate Committee on Appropriations, Bills to Provide
. . . Hearings . 1958, p. 90.
27
Cong. Rec . CIV, Part 14, 17651.
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enhancing of congressional control "there vrould be something
less than complete enthusiasm on the part of the operating
agency,
"
2 ° the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
has the following favorable comments to say:
A basic advantage which can be derived from the
enactment of legislation of this character is that
under the proposed legislation there would be increased
emphasis both in the executive branch and in the Congress
on the expenditure side of the problem— and this could
serve an overall useful purpose. It would result in
Congress sharing in the expenditure problem whereas
today if expenditure limitations are to be imposed,
it is solely the responsibility of the executive branch
and in our ease, the burden really rests with the
Department of Defense. 29
That Congress should have more complete control over
expenditures by reason of its constitutional responsibility in
the granting of obligational authority was brought out in a
Senate report. 30
A writer said:
The bill aims to recapture for Congress direct
control of the billions of dollars, appropriated for
military hardgoods, that pile up from year to year,
waiting to be soent. The current total is put at
some f24-blllion.31
Hazlitt wrote: "Only by this reform can Congress regain
the f power of the purse'—the control over annual spending—that
2%ouse Committee on G-overnment Operations, Bills to
Improve . . . . Hearings . 1956, p. 53.
29Senate Committee on Appropriations, Bills to Provide
. y . . Hearings , 1958, p. 120.
Senate Committee on Appropriations, S. ^ept. 1866,
1958, p. 2.
'Congress Tightens Reins on Long-Term Spending,"
Business Week, ^March 15, 1958, p. 134.
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it has lost. "32
The results of this practise Joss of control over
spending were brought out graphically by Sen. Harry F.
Byrd in a statement on Oct. 2 last |ll95ZJ '•
H0n the last
day of the session I estimated that the President's
January appropriation requests had been reduced by |6
billion or more, and. I called upon the President to
reduce expenditures by the same amount. The President's
mid-year review clearly indicates that these reductions
in appropriations will result in virtually no reductions
in Federal expenditures this year. Obviously the Presi-
dent will use unexpended balances in previous appropria-
tions to keep expenditures at the level he estimated
last January, or higher. This is contrary to the intent
of Congress, which expected a substantial part of the
reductions in appropriations to be reflected in this
year's expenditures." The situation, the senator
concluded, "clearly shows that Congress has lost control
over Federal expenditures and makes it imperative that
this control be recaptured. "33
The foregoing statement was obviously designed to be
read and considered by a public not very understanding of the
details of the appropriation structure, because the implication
is that the President was thwarting the will of the Congress by
"dipping into hidden pots" to get the things he wanted in the
budget presentation which was reduced. This, of course, is not
true, but it does show that Congress has little, if any, control
over the expenditure rate *
Typical of newspaper support for the accrued expenditure
method was the following:
This means in practice that Congress' "power of
the purse" is not quite as powerful as It seems. Nor
is it going to be until Congress adopts one of the
suggested budget reforms which would give it control
not merely over money appropriated but over how much
32
Henry Hazlitt, "To Control Spending," Newsweek,




money is actually spent eacb year.-^
However, there were many who said Congress does not
lose control. Some of these agreed that the legislative control
could be strengthened somewhat for the better, but many, again
mostly Appropriations Committees Members, would not adroit that
even strengthening was necessary. A committee report said*
For example, if the Congress provides funds in
one fiscal year for a special project such as 1,000
aircraft or an atomic carrier, which will require a
total of, say, three or four years for full completion
and delivery, how can it correctly be said that Congress
has "lost" control of the purse strings merely because
all the money will not be obligated or expended during
the first year of the project? The Congress exercised
its control over the purse in approving the project and
the funds for the project. 35
Recommendations leading to the proposed accrued
expenditure method lay great emphasis on necessity of
the Congress regaining control of the purse strings and
in support thereof cite the billions of unexpended carry-
over balances of appropriations at the end of a given
fiscal year. The import of the suggestion seems to be
that adoption of the new method automatically imparts to
the Congress closer control of demands on the Treasury,
with resultant substantial savings. It is true that
large unexpended balances are in the hands of the depart-
ments each year and that in the annual appropriation
bills the Congress does not no 1 exercise direct annual
control over their annual rate of disbursement.^^
Harvey believed that "under the method proposed by the
commission, (annual appropriations! would be arrived at by
estimating the amount required to meet obligations already
Incurred with no possibility of control at that point. "^7
This approach seems entirely reasona-ble. Unless drastic changes
3* The Wall Street Journal (New York), October 2, 1957,
p. 6.
35Houg.e Committee on Approori?tions, H. Rent. 216,
1957, p. 0.
36 Ibid., p. 6.
37Qeorge Y. Harvey, "Contract Authorization in the
Federal Budget Procedure, Public Administration Review ,
Spring, 1957, p. 122.
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to projects already underway were intended by Congress, and
this would play havoc with defense, as well as other programs,
then the estimates of appropriations under the new method,
would in fact, have to be based upon the best expectations of
amounts already obligated which would become payable.
Continuing with his criticism, Harvey calls the
nmroach defeatist and superficial.
The commission's proposal is a superficial approach
that admits the necessity of letting the executive
branch have authority to obligate the public Treasury
years into the future, yet includes no provision for
improved control. Future financing is necessary
within limits, and the job is to find the limits. 3°
The proposal of the commission is, in a sense, a
defeatist approach to the problem. It admits the
necessity of granting to the agencies authority to
make contracts and then attempts to control the flow
of expenditures by separate action after the contracts
are firm. 39
If this is true, then it would certainly not provide
the "power of the purse" which proponents agreed was an
objective, unless Congress took upon itself the immense job of
stopping, modifying, slowing down, speeding up, and otherwise
harassing executive department programs already underway under
some form of congressional authority.
Carryover Balances
The accrued expenditure method was given credit for
the ability to reduce the large carryovers of unexpended
balances. The Assistant to the Comptroller General said that
the method would even "eliminate' 1 the carryover balances "now
available for expenditure at the discretion of the executive
38 ibid
. , p. 124.





The present situation concerning available
balances stems from the fact that congressional
control through appropriation authorizations and
Budget Bureau control through apportionments are
both stated in terras of authority to obligate rather
than budgeted work plans for the cost of goods and
services estimated to be received. ^1
Often cited as an example of the huge carryover bal-
ances, and why they should be M eliminated, " was the carryover
for procurement and production with which the £rmy started
fiscal year 1954, in the amount of {12 billion. To this was
added new obligational authority, providing |l5*2 billion
available for 1954. Although the Korean truce agreement was
signed shortly thereafter, and no additional funds were appro-
priated to that acoount for the next 4 years, money was still
being expended as late as 1957. There was no accusation that
any of the money was misspent. But, under the annual accrued
expenditure method, it was claimed, Congress would have had to
make an annual positive Judgment on the spending, commencing
in 1955. 42
Since contract authority would have had to be used for
long lead-time items under the procedure recommended by the
Hoover Commission, the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) said such authority "would not eliminate
40House Committee on Government Operations, Bills to
Improve . . . . Hearings . 1956, p. 34.
^Ibid., p. 169.
42Senate Appropriations Committee, Bills to Provide
.
. . , Hearings , 1958, o. 135.
.
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carryover authorizations. Nor will it of Itself, reduce
them . . .-* He likewise didn't see where a change "in the
method of providing advance authority would change the amounts
of carryover of unobligated authorizations in any way.
Defending the amounts of unobligated balances in the
Defense Der^ rtment, the Assistant Secretary gave the following
reasons for reserving authority for future obligations:
(1) Shorter lead-time items.
(2) Subsequent engineering changes.
(3) First destination transportation.
(4) Initial spares. .
(5) Work after delivery. 45
The House Appropriations Committee described the
similarity of carryover balances under either system, present
or proposed:
t would happen if the shift were made to the
suggested basis of" appropriating, as provided in pending
legislation, would be the elimination of large unexpended
appropriation balances (which, of course, is not cash in
the Treasury) and substitution of large unfunded contract
authorization balances. Under either system, the grant
of authority to obligate the Treasury to future cash
expenditure occurs at the outset. A fiscal system
cannot change the operating realities of the vast and
complex programs of the Government or the point of time
at which the necessities of the situation make a claim
on the Treasury. Under either system, the large carry-
overs—and there_ will be_ sirailar large carryovers under
both—will co*nsist of~"Ta) outstanding "obligations and
(b) unobligated amounts. Under either system, the die
is cast as to eventual payment when the obligation is
created. On this important point of timinr of the
obligation to future payment, therefore, the proposition
4-5
-'House Committee on Government operations, Bills to
Improve . . . , Hearings , 1956, P. 152.
**Ibld.. p. 153.
-'Senate Committee on Government Operations, Bills to
Provide . . . , Hearing . 1957, p. 35.
. . .
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is essentially a distinction without a difference. The
day of reckoning—day of payment— is inevitable and,
furthermore, the payment will normally occur at the
same time under either system. Once the obligation
or commitment sets the machinery in motion, the Congress
can do little If anything to postpone the day of cash
payment. 46
The fact remains, eliminating all details of termino-
logy* if the Government needs to contract a long time ahead
of actual delivery for goods and services, then there will of
necessity have to be a commitment binding the Government to
pay, as well as the contractor to perform. No change in termi-
nology, accounting or budgeting procedure, or appropriating
method can alter that one fact.
Contract Authority
Any discussion of carryover balances leads also to a
discussion of the causes of having such carryover. They could
be grouped together under one term, contract authority.
Although the Hoover Commission Task Force on Budget and
Accounting "gave a more detailed explanation of the need for
some change in the system, neither the task force nor the
commission gave an acceptable explanation of how the change
from outright appropriations to contract authority would cure
the defects complained of."^
The President realized that
There Is, however, considerable difference of opinion
within the Congress and the executive branch both as
to the advantages and disadvantages of accrued
expenditure appropriations and as to the methods
———— » I .~—»——«—•m~~~m m m it..... ——
—
——— m i i n n I i n . n
46House Committee on Appropriations, K. Rept. 216,
1957, p. 7.




that would be needed for the financing and control
of obligations in advance of appropriations,
primarily for long-lead-time programs. 48
The Assistant to the Comptroller General provided the
following explanation of the implementation of contract
authority under the Hoover Commission recommendations
• . . heretofore both the "contract authorizations"
and subsequent appropriations "to liquidate contract
authorizations" were stated in terms of obligational
authority. Under the annual accrued expenditure
basis of stating proposed appropriations, any neces-
sary authority to enter into contracts and orders for
future delivery of goods and services would be stated
on the obligational basis but the appropriation of funds
would be stated annually in terms of the accrued expendi-
tures for the year based on the more precise planning .
possible on a year-by-year basis of planned performance. 49
Harvey states that "contract authority, to be effective,
must include all of the elements now Included in an appropria-
tion except the one step of making funds available for
payment."^ He also says, "control of expenditures would move
to the executive branch at the time contract authority vat
granted, with the Congress required to take a second- -and
CI
purely ministerial—action to provide money for payment/
It should be recognized then that changing from the present
system to one of contact authorizations in which money for
expenditures is provided by administrative action at some
48
House Committee on Government Operations,
Bill to Improve . . . , Hearings . 1956, p. 14.
49
House Committee on Government Operations,
Bills to Improve . . . . Hearings , 1957, p. 107.





later time ioes not promise to furnish Congress very much, If
any, additional control.
Critics . . . have had a field day in their
comments concerning the administration of the no-
year appropriations. Most of the criticism centers
on the procedure which appropriates funds for the
construction of a carrier or a missile system; and
that this procedure results in large unencumbered
balances at nearly all times. These critics overlook
the fact that the annual allocation and apportionment
process by which obligation authority is funneled down
to the spending level constitutes a complete and thor-
ough reevaluation and rejustification of each specific
program for which apportionment is requested. 52
Although not specific in its report, the Hoover
Commission indicated that the Congress should restate the
contract authority annually as needed. The Director of the
Bureau of the Budget interpreted this to mean '"that unused
contract authority at the end of each year would lapse and
that requests for new authority would be made as needed each
year on the basis of program requirements."" That official
also stated he desired to see a reconsideration of unused
contract authority n in the interest of reducing this large
unobligated dollar carryover."^
However, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptrol-
ler) believed an interpretation such as this disadvantageous
from the operating viewpoint:
CO
Performance Budge ting and Financial Management in
the i/epartment of the Mavy , Research Report of the 196T~
Class, Navy Graduate Comptrollership Program, The George
Washington University, Washington, D. C, February 10, 1961.
S3Senate Committee on Government Operations, Bills to
Provide . . . « Hearing , 1957, p. 54.
5*ibia . . p. 48.
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. . . language such as ''to reduce and eliminate the
large carryover balances of appropriations from one
fiscal year to another" . . . could easily be inter-
preted, and undoubtedly would be, under the explanations
we have received, that you couldn't carry over the
balances necessary to complete a project you have
justified and which has been approved. 55
e, in the case of the so-called long-lead-time
items--and, incidentally, there is a misunderstanding
about what they are—have endeavored to do a better
job by discouraging the buying of every component at
one time; for instance, buying everything needed for a
ship at the time the keel is laid.
Yet, we should have the full authority to finish
it because we shouldn't start it unless we are going
to complete it, but there are certain armaments, certain
gear to go aboard that ship that we should not buy in
that first, or even the second, fiscal year. That
would be unused obligatlonal authority Junobliga tea)
at June 30— the end of a fiscal year. 5°
The real question, the Assistant Oecretary stated,
is "should the Congress change its method ... to one of
appropriating money each year for expenditures and call for
some other method which hasn't yet been defined to provide us
our method of obligation authority to place contracts. 57
The Defense Department also brought up the point that
the legal consequence of contracting authority "is that the
Congress (or any future Congress) is committed to making future
appropriations to meet the required payments (including settle-
ment of claims) in the case of contracts terminated for the
convenience"^ f the Government.
55 Ibid., pp. 44-45.
56 Ibid ., p. 41.
-*' House Committee on Government Operations, Bil ls., to
Improve . . . . Hearings , 1956, p. 162.
58
Ibid ., p. 234.
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Nevertheless, the Comptroller General maintained that
the year-by-year congressional control of program performance,
• • • inherent in the annual accrued expenditure
basis of stating appropriations, provides the
Congress with an improved current and continuing
tool for exercising restraint over contracting on
a program when actual costs are substantially
exceeding the original estimated costs, when
performance is lagging behind schedule, or when
the conditions under which the program was originally
approved have changed substantially. 59
He also asserted that the Government ' s liability to
a contractor under a canceled or terminated contract
. . . would be no different than the Government '
s
liability in similar circumstances under the present
method of stating appropriations in terms of obliga-
tions. If, in the considered judgment of a Congress,
a program entered into by an agency should be curtailed
or eliminated in the best interests of the United
States, the unperformed portion of the contract would
be canceled and undoubtedly the Congress would, if
necessary, appropriate funds to pay for the termination."
The Senate Committee on Appropriations affirmed this
position and added "it is almost inconceivable that the
further action required of the Congress would not be forth-
coming in order to make the payments. However, if by some
improbable mischance this should be the case there is a clear
61
and unequivocal remedy in the Court of Claims." That
committee desired to
. . .
make it absolutely clear that the provisions
of the bill H. R. 8002, if enacted, will have no
59Senate Committee on Government Operations,
Bills to Provide . . . . Hearing , 1957, p. 26.
60
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effect on the liability of the United States to
contractors. The Government's liability sterna from
the grant of obligational authority and not from the
limitation on annual accrued expenditures. 62
Smithies concurred that "if the Government did not
provide assurance to contractors through appropriations, it
would have to do the same thing in some other way» TT°* However,
he felt the annual system :1would merely create the illusion of
control and would provide even less information than the
present system. The only adequate solution is for the Congress
and the executive departments to look ahead at the time they
make and recommend appropriations.'
But, serious objection to the concept of contract
authority was forthcoming from the House Committee on Appro-
priations.
It is often viewed as "merely an authorization,"
with the consequent tendency to pass over it more
lightly, to fail to give it the same thorough examination
as a direct appropriation. Psychologically, the situation
can be likened to a. charge account at the store—relative-
ly easy to open because it is not necessary to have the
cash in hand. Moreover, subsequent appropriation bills
incurred under prior contract authority i-re frequently
viewed as being beyond reach—the attitude that "we
have no choice but to v*j the bill. "65
The Defense Department agreed that "contract authority
might be treated more lightly by the Congress in the granting
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The Chairman of the House Committee on Appropriations
charged: "I can't think of anything that contributes more
directly to irresponsible expenditure and unnecessary expendi-
ture than such contract authority. And that is the heart of
this bill." 67
In the course of hearings on the proposed method, there
were several references to the previously unsatisfactory proce-
dure for granting of contract authority which was exercised by
the Congress until 1950 , when it was abandoned as unworkable
and uneconomical. It is not the purpose of this paper to
explore that facet, except to say that it was decidedly differ-
ent from the contemplated method under the accrued expenditure
principle and, therefore, would not bear on this discussion.
It was assumed that contract authorizations under the
accrued expenditure method would be accounted for on an
obligation basis, with the primary purpose of recording the
authorizations being insurance that the total amount would not
be exceeded. °°
In defense of his task force's recommendation for a
method such as contract authority within the accrued expenditure
principle, the chairman stated:
That instead of being worse off than at present, in
many cases the contractor could be better off.
Because instead of getting contracts as to the
performance of which he would have to speculate,
the contracts that he got would be reasonably firm
• • •» ••• •» MfeW
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and if you coupled annual appropriation, annual
expenditure authority with contracting authority
under which long-term contracts could be entered into,
you would do about the same thing you do now, but you
focus attention on the amount of money you were going
to spend in a particular agency within a particular
period of time. 69
Thus, the controversy surrounding the contract author-
ity feature of the proposed method was basically one of imple-
mentation. It appears that the function it would, perform
would have to be present, regardless of the name or term
assigned to it.
Savings and Economy
The issue of economy and savings which might be possible
under the method stemmed from the Second Hoover Commission's
claim that $4 billion could be saved by carrying out its
recommendations. The result of this claim was that it created
e tremendous public following, in addition to the support
already mustering within the Government for implementation of
the accrued expenditure principle. Some of the public actually
believed that the |4 billion savings was to be achieved each
year from the accrued expenditure method alone.
However, the claim was discounted early by the House
Committee on Government Operations.
The committee was not, however, impressed by the claims
of the Hoover Commission and its task force that $4
billion could be saved, by carrying out the . . .
recommence t ions. In fact, neither the representatives
of the Hoover Commission, the Bureau of the Budget, the
Comrtroll er General, nor any other officials were able
to state how the '' 4 billion figure was arrived at or
ir; what way this saving could be made. must conclude,
therefore, that the figure of |4 billion 1s a myth.
go
•'House Committee on Government Operations, Bills to




The coram ittee is not prepared to endorse any
figure, large or small, that represents any saving
that could be accomplished by enactment of the Hoover
Commission recommendations.?*
The Chairman of the Task Force on Budget and Accounting
had said: "Once shaken down and operative X would hope there
would be a decrease in the cost of accounting."' 1 The
Assistant to the Comptroller General believed 'that the full
implementation of . . . the accrued expenditure approach and
cost budgets would create a great deal of economy if appro-
priately carried out. T The Acting Director, Bureau of the
Budget said: The aaving . . . would come about through
congressional action to revoke program for which appropriations
have previously been made."'-'
The opposite side was presented by the House Committee
on Approoriat ion s
.
Far from contributing to economy and retrenchment,
it tends to the opposite effect. It ties up the hands
of the President and the Congress in making up and
considering future appropriation budgets by introducing
undesirable rigidities
t
into the budget picture. It is
a snare and delusion. 7^
' U. £• , Congress, House, Committee on Government
Opera t ions , Improving Governmental Budge ting, and Accounting
methods
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It was the personal view of the Senate Appropriations
Committee Chairman that: "From the hearings on H. R. 8002,
and from experience in handling appropriation bills over the
years, I seriously doubt whether the adoption of the annual
accrued expenditure system will actually result in any savings
to the American taxpayers. *7*
Administrative Requirements
To begin with, only those agencies which are able to
formulate their budgets on a cost basis
. . . now have accounting systems which furnish, at
successive stages of their operations, data showing
the costs of goods and services ordered, received, and
consumed. Such agencies can operate on a basis of
accrued expenditure appropriations, and other agencies
will be able to do so as soon as accounting systems
which can produce information for cost budgeting are
installed. 76
There were many divergent views on the extent and cost
of the administrative work required to operate an accrued
expenditure system within an accrual accounting set-up. In
its report to Congress, the 2d Hoover Commission stated: w It
has been estimated that 90,000 full-time employees and tens of
thousands of additional manyears in part-time efforts are
needed to compile the financial facts which Government agencies
need, and to assure the public of integrity in Government
spending. N '
'
75senate Appropriations Committee, S. Rept. 1866,
1953, p. 8.
76
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In the executive branch, the salaries alone of
full-time employees in the accounting and fiscal
fields overall are estimated at ,316,000,000.
And, as the '62,400,000,000 covered by the budget
is spent, the legislative branch, through its agent,
the Comptroller General, must review and audit all of
these accounts. He employs 5,726 people at an annual
cost of 132,000,000.78
She Department of Defense estimated that the accrued
expenditure method "could require additional unnecessary work
in separate administrative funding . .
.
, with no compensating
advantage. "7^ The number of additional people to be required
was placed by that department at an estimated 5,000 to 6,000
for their accounts alone. The basis for the estimate was that
it would take almost as many as for an allotment system for
obligations. 80
The Bureau of the Budget, however, took exception to
this estimate as being excessive.
We do not believe any significant amount of
additional clerical work should result from the use
of limitations on accrued expenditures. We can see
no basis whatsoever for estimates indicating the
necessity for 5,000 additional people in one department.
"Under the accrued expenditure limitation procedure,
additional clerical work may be necessary in some cases.
However, we believe this will be insignificant in
relation to the management benefits to be derived
from this procedure. Furthermore, we would hope that
refinements in accounting systems can be made so as to
offset any additional work which may be required. 81
78Ibid ., pp. 1-2.
f^House committee on Government Operations, Bills to
Improve . . . . Hearings . 1956, p. 156.
80Senate Committee on Appropriations, Bills to Provide
. . , Hearings, 1958, p. 128.
81
Ibid ., p. 117.
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The Chairman of the Defense Department Appropriations
Committee in the House said: "They would have to hire so
many accountants you would have to establish many additional
Op
schools at Government expense, I am afraid, to train them.'
It is very probable that such a difference of opinion
as the extent of additional clerical and administrative work
required could be resolved only by actual Implementation
results.
Budget Estimating
The -oroblem of estimating accrued expenditures for the
purpose of submission within the agencies' budgets for appro-
val by Congress was brought into the discussion, and received
more response from contractors in the defense industry than
did the contract authority issue.
Presenting his department's position, the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) said:
You can't estimate accurately in our type of
material item by item. Overall statistical estimates
must be used. One of your problems is this would
not provide a very good method of budget justification,
although I might say we take the department as a whole,
the whole shipbuilding program, or the aircraft program
running 6 or 8 billions of dollars, we can estimate
quite well what it (sic! is going to be spent for the
program as a whole,"but not contract by contract, or
item by item. 83
Difficulty of estimating accrued expenditure for
long lead-time programs by each fiscal year is a
d 1 sadvantage • 84
Op
House Committee on Government Operations, Bills to
Improve
. . . . Hearings, 1957, p. 136.
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. . . if you do a decent job of It you will always
have an estimate far higher than the amount needed.
If you examine any program you will have to examine
it in such a way as to take care of any possible
requirements under the contract. But if thare is a
shortage of material, if the design doesn't work out,
and the progress of the work doesn t go on as originally
scheduled, if there is strike or bad weather or
something of that nature, you won't soend it. "5
The problem of non-delivery of material anticipated to
be received was also discussed by that official.
If you had -500 million worth of material which
could not be delivered by June 30, and we did not know
about it in the soring when the budget was submitted,
we would have to ask for an amendment in the bill to
provide for the increased limitation in the following
year, even though we had not used all of the previous
year s limitation.
W
Relating to the estimating problem, the United Aircraft
Corporation furnished the following statement:
The imposition by Congress of a limitation on annual
accrued expenditures each year Is going to put a
premium on the estimating ability of the Department
of Defense. If too low ceiling is established for
any given year, then the D00 may run out of spendable
funds before the year has expired and contractors will
once again be in an era of financial drought. This
would be true even though the original appropriations
were more than ample. The answer to this problem,
given by the sponsors of the amendment IWigglesworth
amendment, providing for limitations on~"annual accrued
expenditures! is that if such a thing should hapnen
the DOD could always come baok to Congress, justify
the overrun and obtain an increase in the limitation.
We know, however, that as a practical matter this
would all be time-consuming and some financial
hardshln would result. S7
An official of the Bureau of the Budget replied to this
85 lbid ., p. 156.
Of.
Senate Committee on Appropriations, Bills to Provide
. . . .





position that "admittedly, there would be some operational
problems that would have to be worked out. However, the
proposal provides for flexibility in converting to the new
basis." 88
Effects on Program Accompl ishment
pwp ' iwii ! j inn m*m<m*im.mm .. . lit «n.w jiiMP.««n..if ' »*» in nindihmM* . -...mhhh i mmmnmm >i i
Recognizing that deliveries of goods and services may
occur in years other than the year in which they were funded,
the Director, Bureau of the Budget stated: "It would be
necessary to reschedule other deliveries to keen accruals within
the sum appropriated, or else get authority in a supplemental
appropriation act to transfer a portion of the following year's
appropriation to cover the excess of deliveries in the current
year." 89
It was also said, in minimizing the problem, that:
Experience shows that within such appropriations early
deliveries and slippages at the end of a fiscal year
could be expected to offset each other to ft considerable
degree. In some cases, supplemental requests for a
change in limitation may be necessary, but this should
present no greater problem than under present practices,
which frequently entail the need for supplemental
action by the Congress. 90
Smithies claimed that "such restrictions could easily
produce waste and inefficiency. They could result in delay in
completion of work on construction projects or needless delay
^°Percy Rappaport, "improvement of Financial Management
in the G-overnment, !1 The Federal Accountant , VI, No. 4
(June, 1957), 11-12.
89Senate Committee on Government Operations, Bills to
Provide . . . . Hearing;, 1957, p. 55.
90
Senate Appropriations Committee, Bills to Provide . .
•» Hearings. 1958, p. 117.
.
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in the delivery of military material, *^
. . . (ghe President! Bay find that commitments from
previous years are so controlling that little can
be done. Or he may seriously disrupt programming
for future years by cutting appropriation requests
for the sake of the limited effects of those cuts
on current expenditures, 92
Rigid adherence to each part making up the whole of the
appropriation, the Defense Department claimed, "particularly
during a period of changing programs and costs, would unduly
jeopardize effective accomplishment of current planned
programs. yj
Important spokesmen for industry, particularly those
involved in long lead-time production for the military estab-
lishment, were the Raytheon Manufacturing Company and the
United Aircraft Corporation, The former analyzed the legisla-
tion which was eventually enacted as limiting "expenditures
under Government contracts to a specific amount per fiscal
year, irrespective of vhether such periods coincide with
logical contractual check points of performance, or whether
appropriations have been set aside for the balance of perform-
ance required after each fiscal year for which funding has
been accomplished. "94
United Aircraft felt that the proposed t-rocedure could
easily result in shutting off of funds to contractors.
^Smithies, The Budgetary Process . . . , p. 191.
9gIbid ., p. 103.
^Senate Committee on Government Operations, Bills to
Provide . . . . Hearing . 1957, p. 3,6.
'^Senate Committee on Appropriations, Bills to Provide
i~jl.jl> Hearings t 1958, P. 136.
.•
It is a system which sounds good on r "but will
not work in practice. It is*" quite ail right, for
example, to visualize a closing of the books on
June 30, and the opening of a new set on July 1.
The resultant nrorle would be heavy but nerhsns
not insurmountable. However, far more than this
would be involved under S. 434. The closing of the
books on June 30 would also shut off the flow of
funds under continuing contracts for work performed
and deliveries irade after June 30. The opening of the
books on July 1 could not possibly start the flow of
new funds immediately. It would be only the first step
in a complete series of administrative actions leading
finally to the flow of funds from the Treasury. . . .
Then the elephantine process of writing or amending
thousands upon thousands of contracts must be undertaken.
Eventually, with his executed document in hand, the
contractor for the first time since July 1 is able to
collect payments. It has been our experience that 3 to
9 months 3 re required ho complete this administrative
work. 95
None of the major aeronautical and missile contractors
could finance themselves for any such extended period.
The result would be chaotic, and the attendant dis-
ruption and dislocation of production would be
disastrous to Government and industry alike. 96
It should be borne in mini that the forego in? statements
by United ^.ircrsft referred primarily to the "ccruec expendi-
ture concept as recommended by the Hoover Commission, and not
as it vac finally enacted into lav* Shat the ir.njor defense
contractors played an important role in swinging Gon/jrees




It is important to understsnd that, as Smithies says,
"for the ordinary administrative operations of government,
there is a fairly close correspondence between appropriations
?5 Ibld., op. 135-36. 96 Ibid ., p. 136.
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and expenditures in any year . . . for items such as personal
services the carry-over into future years is small."
However, for items which tak.e a long time to develop,
such is not the case. Also, in times "of rapid change in
government programs, there may be wide divergences between
appropriations and expenditures. The expenditures in any one
year may result largely from appropriations of previous years. "9*
Under the proposed method there would be a "better
understanding by many of the Government's financial operations.
Appropriations would be more in line with estimated withdrawals
from the Treasury. "99
But, any advantages under the method would definitely
be limited to those appropriations which finance long lead-time
items since correlation of obligations and expenditures pertain-
ing to other items, in any given year, is already present to
a considerable degree.
Over-emphasis on Accounting ?
One of the Second Hoover Commission members, Commission-
er Holifield, in a separate, dissenting statement included in
the report to Congress, said: "The end result of the . . .
recommendations may be formal consistency in accounting princi-
ples rather than actual gains in economy and efficiency."^-00
97Smithies, The Budgetary Process . . . , p. 103.
98Ibld.
oo
^House Committee on Government Operations, Bills to
Improve
. . . .
Hearings , 1956, p. 155.
100 Commission on Organization . .
.
, Budget and Account-




Smithies had this to say about the traditional
association of budgeting with accounting:
. . . the normal horizontal division of function
in a government department is between policy,
planning, and programming on the one hand and
budgeting and accounting on the other. ... If
the Dolicy group becomes dominant, the organization
tends to base its decisions or its recommendations
too much on requirements or needs rather than on the
notion that its purpose is to achieve an efficient
use of scarce resources. Conversely, if the budget
and accounting group becomes dominant, budgetary
officers tend to make policy judgments on the basis
of inadequate knowledge. A third possibility is that
the policy group is so much out of touch with budgetary
limitations that its proposals are of little use in
the preparation of a realistic budget. 101
It should be evident, then, that an optimum balance
between planning and budgeting/accounting is desirable. "in
view of these possibilities, horizontal arrangements should
recognize that both policy and accounting viewpoints have
essential roles to play in the preparation of a budget and the
actual function of budgeting should not be identified with
either point of view."102
In regard to the accrued expenditure proposal, It was
often termed "the accountant's dream.
"
103 & denial of this
came from the Chairman of the Hoover Commission Task Force on
Budget and Accounting.
This task force consisted of people who were not
essentially professional accountants, lest somebody
101Smithles, The Budgetary Process . . . . p. 44.
102
Ibid. , pp. 44-45.
103
House Committee on Government Operations, Bills to
Improve , . . , Hearings , 1957, P. 135.
* «
look -upon its work as a technician's dream. The
members of the task force were [from top management in
industry. 104
Retention of Obligations.! Base
It was said that in the pest the Government has tended
to emphasize obligationa.l control with little attention to the
expenditure side, but that overemphasis on either one would be
weak. 10^
One professional accountant stated that:
... it is sometimes assumed they are separate and
distinct, and should be kept independent of each
other. This is neither necessary nor desirable.
Appropriations, obligations, costs, expenditures,
disbursements, deal with the same transactions at
different stages. They can and should be covered
in a single integrated system which should also
include financial accounting for property, both
consumable and fixed. l°6
With respect to the Hoover Commission recommendations in
general, that same accountant felt that "all of the emphasis,
... is on the accrual basis and on the cost basis and virtual-
ly no mention of the continuing and equal necessity for
obligation."107
It is apparent that there was some impression that the
two bases of budgeting and accounting for obligations and costs
are somehow in conflict, and that the obligation base could be
done away with. This would appear to be a false assumption.
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) ssid M the use
104House Committee on Government Operations, Bills to











of the obligation base is indispensable, as demonstrated over
the years, in congressional control of the purse.
"
10^
The Department of Defense, in fact, took the position
of favoring the annual accrued expenditure method only if
provision was made for continuing the merits of the obligations!
basis. 109
Economic Implications
The "annual" feature of the accrued expenditure proposal
was questioned by Dr, Gerhard Colin of the National Planning
Association. "With respect to the long-lead projects, I wonder
whether an appropriation 'available until completed' is not
more conducive to economical management than annual appropria-
tion for the work to be done in that particular year."110
"Since not all Government programs can be consummated within a
year, it is, in my opinion, an illusion to believe that we can
budget on 8 365 days' basis."1
I believe we should recognize that for certain
programs budgeting methods must look beyond the 365
days basis if they are to be realistic and not
conducive to waste. The future financial costs of
new programs should be recognized when they are
proposed and deliberated and should be considered
in the context of their economic and fiscal implica-
tions for a number of years. **2
Referring to the present system of estimating
expenditures, Dr. Colm testified:
108 Ibid . , p. 150. 1Q9 Ibld.. p. 236.
House Committee on Government Operations, Bills to
Provide . . . , Hearings , 1957, p. 230.
11\lbid., o. 229.
112
Ibid . , p. 234.
•
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In my judgment, it is useful that the financial
olanning of the Government is based on the best
estimates of expenditures which can be made, which
in the case of long-range projects take account of
these delays in actual spending.
In the case of long-lead projects there is no
direct relationship between expenditure estimates
and the request for appropriations. Consequently,
the agencies are apt to make a more realistic allowance
for those delays than if the relationship between
appropriations and financial planning were more
closely tied together.H3
At this point, with the realization from earlier
sections of this chanter that the accrued expenditure system
on an annual basis would not be much different from the present
obligational system for all items except long lead-time goods
and services, and with the possibility, if the foregoing
statements are soundly based, that it would be difficult if
not impracticable to plan the spending on long term programs
on an "annual" basis, it would seem logical to assume that the
proposed method has very little merit. But, as has been shown,
there are definite advantages to the system from the point of
view of congressional review and "control of expenditures.
The question, then, is do the advantages outweigh the disad-
vantages?
Other Arguments
It was generally agreed by the proponents of the annual
accrued expenditure method that the President could, if he so
desired, have submitted the budgets under that procedure for
those agencies which were in a satisfactory stage of advancement





Congress would have "been under no obligation to anoroprlate in
a 13 nner. The proponents, however, requested legislation
upon which to base adherence to the concept in order to provide
the executive agencies stimulus which they felt was necessary
114in order to accomplish the changeover. The President, of
course, was included in this group.
The opposition at times said that merely because a
method had been successfully used in private industry was no
assurance that it was best for the Government. Anticipating
such a position, the Task Force on Budget and Accounting, in
its report, stated:
anticipate that the proposal may meet the
usual resietance which attends any major change in
Government procedure. However, the timeworn defense
that Government by its nature is so different from
industry that business standards must be compromised
has no validity.
It has been demonstrated that where the will
exists the counterpart of industrial performance is
cossible. An outstanding examole is found in the
accounting and budgeting performance of the Atomic
Energy Commission. 115
The Director of the Bureau of the Budget testified that
most corporations operate on a system similar to that proposed.
"The beard of directors authorizes a contract authority but the
actual budget is on accrued expenditure basis. 1&
*-^House Committee on Government Operations, Bills to
Imnrove . . . . Hearings . 1956, p. 46.
l^u. s., Commission on Organization of the Executive
Branch of the Government, Task Force Report on Budget and
Accounti ng in the United States Government, June 1955
(Washington: U. V. Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 40.
116Kouse Committee on Government Operations, Bills to
Improve . . . , Hearings, 1957, p. 96.
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However, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroll-
er) attempted to clarify such a comparison with industry.
This unfavorable impression of the obligation
basis seems to be derived from statements made by
some members of the accounting profession who have
found the pattern of accounting in Government different
from that area of industrial accounting to which they
are accustomed.
Traditionally, external flnas*i»3 reports of private
enterprise emphasize the determination of periodic
accrued revenues, related accrued costs, and resultant
profits. Secondarily, statements of financial condition
shov; assets, liabilities, and capital on a related basis.
Legal commitments for the future delivery of goods and
services are not generally reported because they do not
involve current costs or assets on hand. 117
Harvey said the Hoover Commission might have rendered
great service had it gone to the root of the trouble,
. . . sought out the causes of each of the (carryoverl
balances, and attempted to find a way of eliminating
them. What it offers is a palliative for symptoms
when what is needed is heroic surgery to find the
cause of the disease and eliminate it. Large balances
exist in Just a few items involving only a few offices
of the government. £ach of them could be readily
isolated for special study.US
In other words, Harvey saw no need for an across-the-
board system change, involving all agencies. That the propo-
sal for annual accrued expenditures was dealing only with the
symptoms, and not the cause, was also seen by Bell, who said
the measure fell ,: into the category of dealing with the trees
instead of the woods. h11 ^
'House Committee on Government Operations, Bills to
Improve . . . . Hearings, 1956, pp. 150-51.
118Earvey, Publle Administration Review . Spring, 1957,
p. 124.
"""Heywood Bell, "Spending Control: Today's Challenge,
Tax Review, XIX, No. 3 (March, 195B), 11.
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Loeffler saw the "advooacy of an 'annual 1 system in
the United States (as_J based on a faulty comparison with the
British system, where the departments, with Treasury consent,
do have the power to contract in anticipation of appropria-
tions." 120 Therefore, r-uch a comparison would not seem Justi-
fi d in view of the U. £. Congress' constitutional duty to
grant all authorizations in advance of obligation.
The House Committee on Appropriations saw the proposed
method as "but one in a series of suggestions for balancing the
budget or reducing expenditures merely by 'changing the
system. ' "121
Changing over to the new basis would in no wise
alter the operating realities or needs of the vast
-^nd comolex programs of the G-overnment. If operating
necessities require advance commitment or obligating
authority to permit of orderly program management and
execution under present budgetary procedures, they will
require similar authority under the accrued-expenditure
rnetnod.122
That same committee probably had in mind working on
the ''woods' 1 instead of dealing witn only the ''trees,''' when
it reported.
Bo funds whatsoever can be withdrawn from the
Treasury save in consequence of valid authority granted
by the Congress to first create an obligation in behalf
of the Government. That is the beginning point in the
budgetary process— the point of control—and it is the
key to the situation. The most consistently accurate
barometer to future spending levels is the dimensions
of authority accorded by the Congress to enter into
120Kerman C. Loeffler, "Alice in Budget Land,"
Na t lonal Tax Jour nal , *un-ust, 1951, p. 5^.
121Kouse Ccir.T.ittee on A cpro vrlations, H. Kept. 216,
1957, P. 6.
122 Ibid . t p. 5.
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obligations on behalf of the Government. Denial of
authority to obligate precludes a subsequent expenditure.
Curtail the input of new appropriations (and other forms
of obligating authority) and spending will come down.
Grant authority to obligate and the expenditure inevitably
will follow in due time. Many who advocate changing to
the accrued expenditure basis of stating appropriations
do not seem to fully appreciate or recognize this
extremely simple truth. 123
Summary
Of the advantages argued in favor of the accrued
expenditure concept, only better and more efficient review by
Congress of the executive agencies' past, present, and contem-
plated future performance of their programs stands out as
valid. Congressional control and "power of the purse" tie in
with this advantage, but only insofar as it is recognized that
the most efficient control is exercised at the instance of the
original granting of authority to obligate (or expend upon)
the Government, and not at a later correction.
There is no doubt that the control of expenditures under
the accrued expenditure method would tend to facilitate more
accurate prediction of the national debt limit for any given
year, provided that the accrued expenditures could be controlled
in actual practice as closely as estimated expenditures now
approach actual cash disbursements. This, to be an advantage,
would clearly depend upon implementation results, and does not
stand out as clearly as does the review advantage, which would
be realized in the budget authorization stage and would not
depend upon execution.
On the other hand, the review advantage very possibly
123lbid
. . p. 6.
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might be as satisfactorily obtained from the use of cost-based
budgets, derived through the use of accrual accounting, with
the obligation base of appropriating retained, and with no
involvement of the accrued expenditure concept.
The proposed method would not eliminate carryover
balances; it could, however, change the form or terminology
attached to those balances.
It is possible that some economy and savings could be
achieved by the method, but there would appear to be additional
and offsetting administrative costs. Better and more efficient
management could possibly be realized, but such results might
be credited to the more modern and efficient accrual accounting
and cost-based budgeting techniques which would have to be
installed in order to adopt the accrued expenditure system
within a particular agency or department.
Program accomplishment might not be adversely affected
by the method, but because of its "annual" character, there is
the definite possibility that more harm than good would be
done in this area.
It is perfectly clear that the proposed annual accrued
expenditure system would not automatically solve all of the
problems inherent in Federal budgeting.

CHAPTER III
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF LIMITATIONS ON
ANNUAL ACCRUED EXPENDITURES
Mass of Support in Favor of Method
Public and official support urging action on the annual
accrued expenditure method of stating budget estimates and
appropriating has been very nearly overwhelming, for the
reasons discussed in the preceding chapter. It is evident
that the majority of the support offered on the part of the
general public can be attributed to almdst an emotional and
sincere belief that Implementation of the method would save
huge amounts of Government expenditures. It is entirely under-
standable that any procedure which promised savings in the
extremely high level of Federal spending, and thereby might
give promise of personal tax reductions, would be well supported.
However, the belief or even hope that savings might
be a realized benefit of the accrued expenditure method was
liberally discounted and seldom stressed by Government offi-
cials and knowledgeable citizens. The support on the part of
these persons can generally be attributed to other features of
the method.







Bureau of the Budget, and the Comptroller General of the United
States strongly recommended the enactment of legislation which
would authorize the conversion of appropriation estimates to
an annual accrued expenditure basis. 2
The President on four separate occasions— a special
message to the Congress, May 10, 1956; a statement when
he signed Public Law 863, 84th Congress, August 1, 1956;
his budget message to the 35th Congress, January 16,
1957; a^d a letter to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, April 18, 1957—has requested this
authority.
3
./hen he signed Public Law 84-863 (70 Stat. 782), which
provided for accrual accounting and cost-based, budgeting, the
President stated:
As originally introduced, . . . the bill would have
provided for adoption of the accrued expenditure appro-
priation procedure. Such a provision in law would have
been highly ciesir^ble and would have many benefits both
for the legislative and executive branches.
I shall recommend to the next Congress that further
consideration be given to the enactment of legislation
which will permit the use of accrued expenditure appro-
priations whenever such procedure is considered appro-
priate in relation to the improved budget and accounting
systems developed under the new law [34-86]5|. ^
The President also urged passage of such legislation
in his message to Congress for fiscal year 1959, January 13,
1958:
o
"U. S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations,
Hearings. To Provide for Improved Methods of Stating Budget
Estimates for Deficiency and Supplemental Appropriations,





^U. 3., Executive Office of the President, Bureau of the
Budget, Improvement of Financial Management in the Federal
Government, October 1956 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing
Office, 1956), p. 40.
.
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Legislation now pending before the Congress to
place Government appropriation requests on an accrued
expenditure basis should be enacted, in accordance with
the recommendations of the Hoover Commission. This is
a businesslike approach, and it is hoped that the
opposition that developed in the past will be withdrawn
as a result of further study and modifications in the
way the procedure if to be applied.
5
That such "opposition" as the President referred to in
his foregoing message did not "withdraw, !! but fought the
enactment of the accrued expenditure method through its entire
legislative history, is shown in the following section.
" Small Bana" of Opposition
The opponents of the accrued expenditure principle in
the House generally included "the ranking Democratic and
Republican members of the Appropriations Committee, and 30 of
the 40 committee members.' A second source of opposition was
attributed to "certain accountants in the Department of Defense,
who have been utilizing their huge reservoir of carry-over
funds." 7
However small in numbers the members of the congression-
al opposition might have been, they were given credit for:
... an almost unearthly faculty for planting
technical and procedural land mines, creating
confusion, and procuring delay. With all the
^Senate Committee on Appropriations, To Provide for
Improved . . . . Hearings , 1953, p. 44.
"Congress Tightens Reins On Long-Term spending,"
Business Week , March 15, 1958, p. 134.
Report of the Citizens Committee for the Reorganization
of the Executive Branch of the G-overnment, Inc., Washington,
" lv 18. IQRft. r>. 4.
7
D. C, Ju y , 1958, p
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tricks left in their bag, they still have a good
chance of stalling the legislative machinery until
time runs out.°
The opposition was also accused of having made "every
attempt to thwart the will of Congress and prevent this legis-
lation, which will bring some reform in budgeting practices
and fiscal policies in the handling of the public's money,
from being passed."' "Virtually all opponents of accrued
expenditure legislation overlook what its sponsors consider
its most important feature— that is annual review of spend-
ing." 10
A careful study of the structure of Congress would
probably reveal the following as bearing on the consistently
strong opposition afforded, by members of the House Appropria-
tions Committee:
Power in Congress is power to represent one's
constituents more adequately, which, in turn, is
additional power to get re-elected. It [Qower| is
greatly sought in Congress. Those who have it are
largely on the receiving end of benefits flowing from
the seniority system. But special power held by
members of the Appropriations Committees is not
exercised for the nation as a whole.
As it is. Congress and the nation must rely heavily
on the judgment of congressional Appropriations Committees,
and if there is another source of information, their power




^U. S., Congressional Record , 85th Cong., 2d. Less.,
1958, CIV, Part 14, 17649.
"
10White Paper Number Three, Annual Accrued Expenditure
Budgeting: what It Means and Why lT~is Needed, Citizens
Committee for the Reorganization of the Executive Branch of the
Government, Inc., Washington, B. C, December 1, 1957» P» 4.
^Robert Ash Wallace, Congress ional Control of Federal





The House Committee on Appropriations issued a report
during March 1957 "on its study of the plan suggested by the
executive "branch to improve congressional control of the
budget. ..hile the plan itself did not specifically deal with
the stating of appropriations on an annual accrued expenditure
basis, it was included in the study. . . . "^2
... it is the view of the subcommittee on Defense
Department Appropriations that the accrued -expenditure
method should not be adopted. It has disadvantages
and offers no improvement. This is not to infer that
present methods and processes are perfect or the best.
There may be a better way to nresent and process the
Federal budget. The best system that can be devised
ought to be employed, but the proposed accrued -expenditure
method is not it. The point is, there is no simple
shortcut, no magic retrenchment device. No budgetary
system has a built-in guaranty of economy or efficiency. *3»
Although there were numerous public organizations which
openly supported the accrued expenditure legislation, neither
the National Association of Manufacturers nor the United States
1 kChamber of Commerce was included. -^
Congressional Consideration
Several bills designed to implement the Second Hoover
Commission's recommendations on budgeting and accounting were
the subject of hearings held in the Senate during March 1956.
Attention was mainly directed toward one of the bills, S. 3199.
12IK S. , Congress, Senate, Committee on Government
Operations, Financial Management in the Federal Government
.
86th Cons-. , 2d Sess., I960 (Washington! U. S. Government
Printing Office, 1961), p. 99.
^U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations,
Administration Plan to Improve Congres sional Control of the
l§ud>et t 35th Cong. , lstTess.
,
' 1§5j r^* Rept. 216, p. 8."
Business 'ieek, March 15. 1958, p. 134.
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During the hearings, it was agreed that some of the
objectives of the hill could be attained by administra-
tive a3tiea and, therefore, no additional legislation
was required in these areas. On the other hand, the
bill did not provide for the submission of budget
requests to Congress based on an accrued expenditure
basis, one of the important recommendations of the
Hoover Commission.
At the conclusion of the hearings, the staff of the
committee {Subcommittee on Reorganization of the Committee
on Government Operations] , in collaboration with repre-
sentatives of the General Accounting Office, the Bureau
of the Budget, and other Government agencies, redrafted
the bill. iho-e objectives which could be attained by
administrative auction were omitted and specific language
authorizing the submission of budgetary request on an
annual accrued expenditure basis was added. The revised
bill (S. 3397) was introduced on May 21, 1956, by the
chairman of the subcommittee with 30 Senators as co-
sponsors. Further hearings were held by the subcommittee
and, on June 7, 1956, the bill was unanimously reported
. . . by the full committee. It passed the Senate on
Jupe 20, 1956.
^
However, in the house, the provision for submission of
budgetary requests for appropriations on aft annual accrued
expenditure basis was eliminated by the Committee on Government
Operations in reporting H. R. 11526, a companion bill to S.
3897. In its report the committee stated in part:
The committee heard strong testimony from the chairman
of the Committee on Appropriations of the House and
the ranking minority member of that committee objecting
to the accrued expenditure device primarily on the
ground that it would necessarily lesd to contract
authority for programs which extend beyond 1 fiscal
year. It was felt that contract authority weakened
congressional control, and it would not realize the
benefits claimed. On the basis of these objections
and the committee's own study, the provision for
appropriations on an annual accrued expenditure wp s
deleted from the bill. 1?
^f-enete Committee on Government Operations, Financial
Managemen t, p. 93.
16 Ibid .
!7u. Z. t Congress, House, Committee on Government Opera-
tions, Improving Governmental Budgeting and Accounting Methods
and Procedures , 84th Cong., 2d Sees., 1956, H. Rept. 2734
to accompany H. R. 11526, p. 4.
..
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The House of Representatives passed S. 3897 on
July 13, 1956, after amending It "by inserting the
language of H. R. 11526 in lieu of the text of the
Senate bill. The Senate disagreed to the House amend-
ment and asked for a conference. The conferees met
on July 19, 1956, at which time the House insisted on
striking out the provisions that budgetary requests be
submitted to Congress on an annual accrued expenditure
basis. As a result, three Senate conferees refused to
sign the conference report. The remaining Senate
conferees agreed to the report after receiving assurances
from the House conferees that this requirement would be
reconsidered during the next Congress. The House con-
ference report . . . made no reference to reconsideration
in the next Congress, whereupon serious objection was
raised by several Senators on the floor of the Senate
. . . before the conference report was approved. 18
Although it did not include the accrued expenditure
device, S. 3897 as enacted into Public Law 84-863 (70 Stat. 782),
did provide for cost-based budgets, an accrual accounting
program, and a simplified allotment system which is the founda-
19tlon of an accrued expenditure system. Advantages of cost-
based budgeting, in conjunction with accrual accounting, are
discussed in a later chapter insofar as they provide at least
some of the objectives claimed by proponents of the accrued
expenditure system.
At the beginning of the 85th Congress, several bills
were introduced to provide for stating appropriations on an
accrued expenditure basis. During study, consideration, and
debate on that principle lasting over 2 years, the major
question raised was:
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. . . whether it gave Congress tighter control over
Government expenditures. Many members contended that
it was the best way to obtain this control, which the
Congress does not have. The proponents of the legis-
lation cited the billions of dollars appropriated by
Congress and carried over each year by the executive
departments and agencies over which Congress has little
or no control. Other members, who opposed the legisla-
tion, contended that it would not provide the control
needed by Congress, since contract authority would have
to be substituted for the fund carried over each year,
and the Congress would be in the same predicament as
before. 20
In the Senate, S. 434, introduced on January 9, 1957,
by Senator Kennedy, for himself and 49 other members of the
Senate, was reported favorably after hearings during April
1957 and passed the Senate on June 5 of the same year.
The House Committee on Government Operations held
extensive hearings in March and April 1957 on 14 bills
which provided for improving Federal budgeting and
appropriations processes. Nine of these bills related
to accrued-expenditure basis of stating appropriations
and the five remaining bills to other budget and accounting
matters. Following these hearings, the committee reported
a new bill, H. R. 8002 . . ., introduced by Representative
Rogers of Florida on June 17, 1957, which contained sub-
stantially the same provisions as S. 434. In its report,
the committee commented on the views expressed by Members
of the House Appropriations Committee as follows:
"The committee gave intensive study and
consideration, as always, to the views of the
Committee on Appropriations as contained in a
joint letter from Chairman Cannon and the ranking
minority leader, John Taber, and as so ably presented
at the hearings by Congressman Mahon, the chairman
of the subcommittee Defense Department. We recognize
the great service they are rendering to the Congress
and the country by their meticulous scrutiny and
analysis of all appropriation proposals. We agree
with Mr. Mahon that there is no magic in the accrued-
expenditures method. But the committee is convinced
that the present dimensions of the Federal budget
demand whatever improvements can be made in its
process. We believe such a substantial improvement
will be brought about to justify the passage of this
legislation. <dl
20 21
Ibid., pp. 98-99. Ibid., p. 102.
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Action on the floor of the House did not begin until
i-iarch 4, 1958, when Representative Wigglesworth introduced an
amendment which eliminated all of the language after the
oo
enabling clause and substituted new language. ^ The Giggles-
worth amendment was a compromise that had been "worked out
seemingly to the satisfaction of all groups concerned except
some of thoge who are on the Committee on Appropriations. ^
The main reasons for substituting the Wigglesworth
amendment were given by Representative O'Neill as:
. • . there were some criticisms made, some doubt
expressed by some of the suppliers of Government
goods, by some of the contractors especially in the
defense industry, and perhaps I should say especially
in the aircraft industry, that this bill as originally
reported from our committee would interfere with the
obligational authority for long-term contracts. So
an attempt was made to work out legislation that would
obviate any criticism, and make it such that it could
not be criticized, and meet the objections raised to
the measure as we had reported it. 24
No hearings had been held by the House on the language
contained in the Wigglesworth amendment. It was fundamentally
different from previous approaches to the accrued expenditure
principle, and also the bill (S. 434) passed by the Senate
almost a year earlier, in that appropriation procedure would
remain essentially the same, but with an accrued expenditure
limitation placed on the ensuing fiscal year. In the Senate
bill, the appropriation, in effect, would have constituted the
22
U. S., Congressional Record
. 85th Cong., 2d Sess.,
1958, CIV, Part 3, 3421.
23





accrued expenditure limitation, on top of which there would
have been added contract authority for long lead-time items.
Other differences, and their effects in implementation of the
accrued expenditure method, are discussed in later sections.
Final Passage
The Wigglesworth amendment was debated for two days
and adopted by the House on March 6, 1953 > as a substitute for
the original provisions of H. R. 8002. The amended bill was
placed on the Senate Calendar, and . . . referred to the Senate
Committee on Appropriations for further study. Following
hearings on July 3, 1958, H. R. 8002 was reported favorably
to the Senate. -
In its report, the Senate Committee on Appropriations
included the following comments:
The present method of granting obligatlonal authority
would remain the same. The adoption of this system
of accrued-expenditure limitations would require an
expenditures accounting system in moderate addition
to the present accounting system for controlling
obligational authority which would be negligible
significance as compared to the tighter congressional
budgetary control,
It is the view of the committee that it is essential
that the Secretary of Defense be given authority to
transfer the unused portions of the limitations on
annual accrued expenditures. Not to provide such
authority could seriously endanger the defense program.
If limitations on annual accrued expenditures were
imposed it would be Just as necessary, if not more so,
that the Secretary of Defense have a wide degree of
flexibility to transfer, from one limitation to the
other, unused portions of the limitations. Therefore,
the committee recommends amendments to the bill to





provide the necessary authority for such transfers.
'The House bill provides that it would be in order
to include in appropriation bills language relating to
availability of appropriations of funds previously
made. Thus it would be in order to include language to
transfer, rescind, or reappropriate funds previously
appropriated or to amend limitations in a previous act
in an appropriation bill. Such a provision would operate
to amend the Senate rules in that the proposed language
would no longer be subjected to a point of order and,
therefore, a simple majority rather than a two-thirds
vote would be required to consummate the proposal. The
committee recommends the deletion of this provision. 26
On July 31 f 1958, H. R. 8002 passed the Tenate, with
amendments oertaining to the above comments included. On
August 14, 1958, the House agreed to the Senate amendments and
the bill was approved by the President on August 25, 1958, as
Public Law 85-759 (72 Stat. 852), in effect, amending section
201 of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 to authorize the
application of the accrued expenditure system to all appropria-
tions and fund accounts when the President determines that
there has been established an adequate system of accrual
accounting. -7 The limitation on annual accrued expenditures
proposed, by the President would not be effective unless the
Congress chose to include the limitation in an appropriation
bill for the agency concerned. ?8 Additional provisions of the
enacted legislation, and its implementation, are discussed in
later sections.
2oU. S. , Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations,
Providing for Improved Methods of stating Budget Estimates
.
35th Cong., 2d Sess., 1958, S. Kept. l56b to accompany H. R.
8002, pp. 1-3.







The provisions of Public Law 85-759 expire on April 1,
1962. During this period the annual accrued expenditure
system is on trial and the manner in which it operates will
have a substantial bearing on whether this legislation will
be extended. 29 <\ s j[ B shown later, the system has not yet been
placed into use for even one appropriation; the future of the
accrued expenditure method is dim indeed.
On explanation given for Congress' inclusion of the
April 1, 1962 expiration date was:
... in order to give the incoming President,
regardless of who he may be, the opportunity to
acquaint himself with that system. Remember, the
incoming President will be seated, on January 20 of
1961 which would be after the budget was submitted
for the coming fiscal year. So that gives him a year
in which to prepare a new budget and to decide for
himself what he wants to do about the situation and
what Congress wants to do about the situation. 30
Regardless of the fact that the President who was
inaugurated in January 1961 , John F. Kennedy, was responsible
for introduction of S. 434 in the Senate, and is reported to
possess superior understanding of Government budgeting and
accounting procedures, it would appear that the April 1, 1962
expiration date of Public Law 85-759 is to arrive too soon to
provide sufficient opportunity for practical evaluation. This
is especially true in view of the unsuccessful attempts so far
in getting the House Committee on Appropriations to retain
language on annual accrued expenditure limitations in several
appropriation bills.
29Ibid., p. 106.
3° Cong. Rec, CIV, Part 3, 3448.
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Provisions of the Law
Public Law 85-759 amended section 201 of the Budget and
Accounting Act of 1921 to authorize the application of the
accrued expenditure system to all agency appropriations and fund
accounts when the President determines that there has been estab-
lished within the agency an adequate system of accrual account-
ing.- This stipulation was necessary because an agency
"couldn't go overnight to an accrued expenditure budget without
first laying the accounting and factual groundwork for it. "32
In other words, "in order for an agency to be able to estimate
its accrued expenditures for a fiscal period, it should have
had experience in accounting on such a basis for a reasonable
period in advance of undertaking such a budget plan."33
After such determination, the President was authorized
to transmit to Congress a proposed limitation on annual
accrued expenditures for each appropriation or fund and
may include in his budget recommendations for authorizing
the head of any department or establishment to make
transfers within his department or establishment between
such limitations. The limitation on annual accrued
expenditures proposed by the President would not be
effective unless1 the Congress chose to include the
limitation in an appropriation bill for the agency
concerned. 34
Although it was interpreted by many, including former
Senator Kennedy, that passage of the bill "would imply that the
^Senate Committee on Government Operations,
Financial Management , p. 105.
32U. S., Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Committee
on Government Operations, Hearings, Bills to Improve Grovern-
mental Budgeting and Accounting Methods, 84th Cong., 2d Sess.,
95o, p. 100.
55 ibia .. p. 177.





Congress will take action on the appropriations on the same
basis/' such was not the case, as is shown in the next chapter.
Although the present method of granting obligational
authority would remain the same, the adoption of this system
of accrued expenditure? ''would require an expenditures account-
ing system in moderate addition to the present accounting system
for controlling obligational authority whloh would be of
negligible significance as compared to the tighter congressional
budgetary control.''^6
The original Senate version, S. 4^4, was claimed to
"incorporate a vastly simpler system of budget estimates. It
is uncomplicated by limitations on expenditures and other devices
which would have to be included in the agency accounting system
to keen track of these limitations. ") '
The limitation on annual accrued expenditures was
required to be charged with the cost of goods and services
received, advance payments made, progress payments becoming due,
and any other liabilities becoming payable during the year.
The unused balance of such limitation would lapse at the end of
the year and any obligations incurred during the year or prior
years which do not become payable would be charged to a
succeeding year limitation in which the obligation becomes
-^U. S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Reorganization
of the Committee on Government Operations, Hearing. Bills to
Provide for Improved Methods of Stating Budget Estimates ,
85th Cong., 1st Sess., 1957, p. 16.
* Senate Committee on Appropriations, Rept. 1866, 1958,
p. 1.
^Senate Committee on Appropriations, To Provide for




Since the method of granting obligations! authority
remains the same, it follows that the granting of contract
authority is not involved, as it would have been under the S. 434
and earlier versions.
/I though the accrued expenditure method as enacted
"did not eliminate the carryover of appropriation balances, it
does allow Congress to control their use by determining, through
the limitation on annual accrued expenditures, the value of
goods and services which could be received each year."'
In addition to the procedure for appropriation bills as
provided for by Public Law 85-759, there are the following other
means of authorising expenditures from the Treasury which would
not be covered
:
For example: (1) Authorizations to expend from public
debt receipts; (2) contract authorizations; (3) revolving
and management funds; and (4) permanent appropriations.
For the fiscal year 1959, these authorizations
(comprisecf approximately $10 billion out of the $72.4
billion in new obligations! authority requested by the
President, or approximately 14 percent. There would be
no expenditure limitations on these items under [the
lav,' as enacteSJ. The question is whether there is any
effective way to place such expenditures under complete
con trol . 39
It is an important distinction that under the procedure
which was enacted no lapsing of appropriations! would be involved.
Only the unused balance of the limitation on annual accrued
expenditures would lapse, and obligations becoming payable later
-
/




^Senate Committee on Appropriations, To Provide for
Improved . . . , Hearings, 1958, p. 85.
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would have to be charged against the limitation for the year in
which they become payable. For this reason, the enacted version
was more acceptable to many of the producers of military goods,
particularly in the aircraft industry, than was the Senate
40
version, S. 434, which generally was opposed by this group.
Did the Law Accomplish the Objectives of
the Hoover Commission ?
It has been shown that the final version as enacted,
based upon the Wigglesworth amendment which was substituted for
the entire bill, was a compromise which had not had benefit of
hearings in the House to evaluate its merits, but was designed
to satisfy all groups concerned, except possibly the House
Committee on Appropriations which was opposed to the principle
itself. 41
Opinion as to whether the law achieved the objectives
of the Hoover Commission varies from the affirmative, sometimes
with reservation that such opinion pertains only to one or more
of the several objectives, through evaluation as a compromise or
modification, to the assertion by the House Committee on Appro-
priations that "the law that was finally enacted was as differ-
ent from the original concept as day is from night. ::42
40Buslness Week
.




U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations,
Treasury and Post Office Departments, and the Tax Court of the
United States Appropriations Bill, 19b0 » 8bth Cong., 1st Sess..
1959, H. Rept. 227 to accompany H. R. 5805, p. 10.
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The original concept and "bill would have made a
fundamental change in the method of stating budget esti-
mates and making appropriations. The enacted version
does not; it provides merely for the suoerimposition of
an accrued expenditure limitation on an appropriation
made on the traditional basis.
The original concept was advanced as a method of
enabling Congress to exercise closer control over spending.
Yet the enacted version not only does not provide for
changing present methods of making appropriations but
actually provides for granting the department head author-
ity, in the words of the law itself, to make transfers,
within his department or establishment, between such
limitation on annual accrued expenditures. 5 ' Where is the
closer control of spending by the Congress when such
transfer authority is granted? . . .
The original concept and bill contemplated tremendous
reductions in unexpended carryover balances of appropria-
tions. The enacted version does not. Of course, it should
be noted that even under the original version, there would
have been offsetting increases in unexpended carryover
balances because of the substitution of contract authority
with no resultant change in overall unexpended carryover
balances. ^3
The Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget, felt "that
either one of these alternatives §1. R. 8002 or S. 43jJ) would
achieve the objectives of the Hoover Commission in terms of
providing for the annual review of the unexpended and unobligated
balances, and in providing Congress with more detailed informa-
tion about changes in programs which do occur, as we all know,
during the course of a budget year.
It should be evident that the legislation did not change
the existing appropriation process as proposed by the Hoover
Commission but added to it instead the authority for imposing
limits on the goods and services that could be received by
43 lbId .. pr>* 10-11.
44
Senate Committee on Appropriations, To Provide for
Improved . . . . Hearings , 1958, p. 103.
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agencies In any one year. This was "expected to attain the
control objectives of the Hoover Commission proposal. "^5 jf j_n
fact "control" was the major category of objectives sought by
the Hoover Commission, then there is no doubt that Congress
would achieve such control of at least the expenditure rate.
As for other so-called objectives discussed in the
previous chapter, the achievement by means of the enacted con-
cept is not so clear. Certainly no carryover balances would be
eliminated. Savings and economy, throughout the period of study
and debate nebulous and controversial quantities, were generally
agreed to be possible through improved financial management and
accounting procedures, not as a direct result of implementation
of the legislation. Administrative efficiency and a better
understanding of the G-overnment 1 s financial operations, including
that of the general public, are likewise dependent upon the
mechanics of Implementation, and are not likely to be achieved
automatically.
The Control Problem in Implementation
The Coast G-uard , when it was confronted with the request
to Include in its budget estimates for fiscal years I960 and
1961 limitations on annual accrued expenditures, considered the
question of controlling accrued expenditures during a given year.
... we must control both the obligations and the change
In undelivered orders effected during the year. That is,
to hold accrued expenditures down [If requireHJ* we roust
either reduce the amount of money obligated during the
esr or let our undelivered orders build up (defer
elivery dates of ordered materials ... or refuse
Ac





to accept delivery . . • until a subsequent year. °
However, the first alternative method for slowing down
the accrued expenditure rate
. . . generally means cutting back programs, an
operationally undesirable and inefficient procedure.
. . . Unobligated (operating Exoense| funds may not
be carried over from year to year... they are lost
to the Coast Guard. Hence, controlling accrued
expenditures by reducing obligations is an unacceptable
device. 47
The second alternative method of controlling accrued
expenditures within a year
... is by exercising control of the delivery of
ordered material. That is, every effort must be made
to insure that material "budgeted" for delivery in a
specific year is actually delivered in that year.
A speed-up or a delay in deliveries from one year to
another will upset the estimated accrued expenditure
limitation for one of those years. For this reason,
means must be developed to control the actual receipt
• of procurements so that such receipts during a specific
year are kent closely in line with the estimates for
that year. 48
Summary
From the foregoing it should be evident that the accrued
expenditure limitation involves considerably more than obligat-
ing against an appropriation authorization and issuing a check
or spending against that same appropriation when the obligation
becomes payable, whether in the same fiscal year, or in a sub-
sequent year. In simple terms, there is only one control
involved in the latter method, whereas with the aocrued
^Deputy Chief of Staff, U. S. Coast Guard, Memorandum








expenditure limitation imposed there is the necessity, especially
toward the close of a fiscal year, of maintaining effective
control on total accrued expenditures for that year.
It would appear probable that the maintenance of the
additional administrative control for accrued expenditures would
prove, especially toward the end of the fiscal year, at least
as difficult as the controls required for obligations against




RESULTS OF ATTEMPTS TO EFFECT LIMITATIONS
WITHIN APPROPRIATIONS BILLS
The ranking minority member of the House Committee on
Appropriations, Rep. John Taber, made the following statement
during an early phase of congressional consideration of the
accrued expenditure method: "if the Congress passes the bill
providing that the budget should be submitted on an accrual
basis, it is going to be impossible for the Appropriations
Committee to do any other way, even though they would not be
bound by that."* Although that statement, made at the time it
was, referred specifically to a strict interpretation of the
Hoover Commission recommended procedure for annual accrued
expenditures, and not to the modified version which was eventual-
ly enacted, it is the purpose of this chapter to trace the
developments relative to inclusion of limitations on annual
accrued expenditures in the President's budget proposals to
Congress, and the rejection of those limitations by the Commit-
tees on Appropriations.
During the process of Senate approval of the final
1U. S., Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Committee
on Government Operations, Hearings. Bills to Improve Govern-






version, the Chairman of that body's Committee on Appropriations
stated J "Whether or not there are substantial advantages to be
gained by using the annual accrued expenditure system, I felt
that the Congress should have the benefit of an actual experience
upon which to make a permanent decision." 2 He also said J
I believe that the appropriations to the Department
of Defense for military functions which remain available
until expended are the logical ones to which the system
should be applied for the trial period. These appropria-
tions involve long lead-time procurement, research and
development projects, and the construction of military
facilities and installations, some of which require
several years.
3
Because the Department of Defense had not than (and
still is in the process of effecting) a system of accrual
accounting which could be approved by the President for the
purposes of including in budget estimates such limitations on
annual accrued expenditures, it was not possible to apply a
trial experience upon the appropriations of that department.
Proposed Limitations in President's
Budget Submissions
The President submitted to the Congress the following
six requests with aocrued expenditure limitations in his I960
budget:
Veterans Administration, construction of hospital
and domiciliary facilities
General Services Administration, repair and
improvement of Federally-owned buildings
2U. S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations,
Providing for Improved Methods of Stating Budget Estimates
.
85th Cong., 2d Sese., 1958, S. Rept. 1866 to accompany H. R.
8002, pp. 6-7.





Operating expenses, Canal Zone





cquisition, construction and improvement4
The foregoing six items comprised only 0.41 percent of
the total i960 fiscal year budget request.-
The President was said to have selected certain
organizations which have good accounting systems on an accrual
basis, and designated them to experiment to see whether or not
the anticipated advantages will materialize, "° The President's
selections were effected through requests on the part of the
Bureau of the Budget for designated agencies to include esti-
mated limitations of annual accrued expenditures in their
budget submissions.
In amount of dollars Involved, the (feast Guard's two
appropriations comprised by far the largest portion.
•
The Chairman of the Treasury-Post Office Departments
Appropriations Subcommittee in the House made the following
statements during the hearings on the I960 budget:
Then I was astonished when I got the budget to
see that they had singled out six items involving
four agencies that they [the Bureau of the Budget by
order of the President) were going to use as guinea
pigs during this session of the Congress. ... I was
amazed that two of those items were in the budget of
the Coast G-uard, which in my judgment is already
operating as the most economical and efficient agency
4U. B#l Congress, House, Subcommittee on Treasury-Post
Office Departments Appropriations of the Committee on Appro-
priations, Hearings, Treasury-Post Office Departments
Appropriations for I960* Treasury Department and Tax Court of
the United tates, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1959, p. 26.




If they are going to try to save by working on
the Coast Guard, I do not think they are going to
make much saving on a program of that kind, 8
I see no reason for making the Coast Guard the
guinea pig in this experiment. I think they are
efficient; and when I asked the Budget Director why
that was done he said that they were doing it because
the Coast Guard was efficient and that their books were
in such shape that they could apply this law in some
measure.
9
The Secretary of the Treasury testified in the appropria-
tions hearings the following ye°r, for fiscal year 1961, that
the Coast Guard was the agency within the Treasury Department
which was furthest advanced toward an established system of
accrual accounting. 1°
In explaining to the subcommittee why the Coast Guard
was designated to experiment with the new method, the Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury, Fiscal testified:
If it is not practical for the Coast Gu«?rd, then
I say it is not practical for the rest of the Government.
If it is practical for the Coast Guard, there is no
reason why the rest of the Government cannot adapt
itself to it. If it costs the Coast Guard too much
I do not see why we should saddle this heavy cost
on the rest of the Government.il
I think in the Coast Guard organization it will be a
8Ibid . . p. 500. 9Ibid .. p. 25.
U. S., Congress, House, Subcommittee on Treasury-
Post Office Departments Appropriations of the Committee on
Appropriations, Hearings. Treasury-Post Office Departments
Appropriations for 19C1 . Treasury Department and Tax Court of
the United States . 86th Cong., 2d Sees., I960, p. 50.
11
House Subcommittee on Treasury-Post Office Departments
oropri^tions, Hearings , 1959, p. 515.
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fair test, it will be a competent test, and if it
does not work, I think, the Treasury will be the
first one to say so. 12
Arriving at the Limitation
The limitations submitted in the I960 Coast Guard
budget which were placed on annual accrued expenditures for the
two appropriations, Operating FXpenses and Acquisition, Con-
struction, and Improvement, were designed to provide that agency
"all the flexibility they need and can have. Because it is
experimental , we did want to penalize them . . . with a tight
limitation." 15
It was agreed by the Bureau of the Budget that a limita-
tion set too close to the appropriations so that it would
interfere with operations would be harmful, and, therefore, an
ample safety (also called " contingency") factor was necessary.
The figure agreed upon "was 10 percent, and ... it was purely
arbitrary.' 1 That additional 10 percent factor was applied
to each of the two Coast 3uard appropriations involved.
The following year, for the 1961 budget, the limitation
proposed for the Operating Expenses appropriation included only
a 5 percent safety factor. For both expropriations, in I960
as well as 1961, transfer provisions were proposed in the
language
.
Accordingly, a limitation equal to the estimated
accrued expenditures for 1961 plus a 5 percent
"safety" factor has been included in the
appropriation language. I limitation equal to
12
Ibid., P . 517.
1 3 Ibid .. p. 516. -
1
Ibid ., p. 517.
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the estimated accrued expenditures for 1961 plus a
10 percent "safety* factor has been included in the
AC&I appropriation language. The AC&I language also
permits us to transfer up to 5 percent of the AC&I
accrued expenditure limitation to L or 5 percent of
the OH limitation to AC&I, if need be. 15
For example, in the no«-year appropriation request for
Acquisition, Construction, and Improvement, for 1961, the Coast
Guard's estimated expenditures, or actual disbursements, were
$27 million. The accrued expenditures in AC&I were estimated
$24.1 million. The accrued expenditure limitation was set 10
percent higher than the $24.1 million; that is, {26.5 million. 16
The 10$ contingency factor added to the AC&I estimated
expenditures to arrive at the limitation figure appears to be
both realistic and necessary. Although, because of the annual"
nature of the Operating Expenses appropriation, actual expendi-
tures would coinclae closely with accrued expenditures, this is
not so In the AC&I fund. An incorrect estimate of accrued
expenditures under AC&I, involving items of lone? lead-time
procurement, at the time of formulating the budget within the
agency, approximately the September before the commencement of
the fiscal year, would tend to cause serious errors in subse-
quent years' limitations on annual accrued expenditures within
that appropriation. The resulting "early deliveries" and
"slippages' would have a ''multiple effect, for several years
-^Denuty chief of Staff, U. S. Coast Guard, Memorandum
to Chiefs, Offices and Divisions, 11 December 1959, p. 1.
;se Subcommittee on Treasury-Post Office Depart-
ments Ar>pro-orlations f Hearings . I960, p. 570.
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hence, Thus, there would be a definite need for some amount of
leeway, or a 'safety*' factor, within which to permit either
errors or occurrences beyond the agency's control to be
absorbed.
ptablishment o f Co n
t
rols
It is only possible to discuss the tentative plans for
setting up of controls to insure staying within the accrued
expenditure limitations, because the limitations were eliminated
in the Congress, and never were imposed.
A further enlargement of the existing accounting system
was contemplated in the Coast Guard to provide specifically
for control of accrued expenditures.
The ''appropriation*' limits us to a specific number
of dollars which we are authorized to "obligate". Since
the appropriation is a limitation on obligations, we
have set up accounting controls to stay within these
obligation;;! limits. $ow that we are faced with an
accrued expenditure limitation, in addition to controls
against over-obligation, we must set up further controls
to insure that we do not accrue expenditures beyond the
proposed limitation. 17
It was estimated that 16 additional people would be
necessary to establish and maintain the controls in the Coast
Guard required to implement the '.ccrued expenditure procedure,
at s total cost of approximately §60,000 per year.l^ The number
of 16 was based on the need for one additional person at each
of the Coast Guard accounting centers .19
17Deputy Chief of Staff, LSCG, Memorandum, p. 1.
l^House Subcommittee on Treasury-Post Office Departments
Appropriations, Hearings
. I960, p. 571.
19^House Subcommittee on Tressury-iFost Office Departments
Appropriations, Herrings, 1959, t>. 505.
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The Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Fiscal, stated
that his department felt the cost for the Coast G-uard for
accounting for the limitations "will be nominal: probably fifty
or one hundred thousand dollars. But if it runs to 1300,000
or -400,000, this [the actual imposition of the limitations) will
give us an opportunity to demonstrate it." He Implied that
the amount of f300,000, or higher, would be excessive, and not
Justified.
Justification of the Proposed Experiment
The Assistant Secretary also testified that the accrued
expenditure procedure would not have much affect upon presenting
the budget estimates "except that the agencies will have to make
their plans for the subsequent year more precise and will not
n21have as great leeway as they do now.
He further elaborated:
The one big advantage if this is practicable
Governmentwide, it will give a control both in the
Congress and to the President in limiting the overall
expenditures of this Government. . . .
At the moment I am planning and the Secretary
£>f the Treasurjl will plan in the debt limit recommendation
that he will bring up to Congress shortly, thst in this
year of I960 there will be $77 billion of Government
expenditures and we will get a public debt limitation
predicated on that fact.
But there is nothing in our present system today
that will limit expenditures to 77 billion if agencies
decide they want to spend (liquidate obligations which
become payabllj ro°re. If you have about |70 billion or
thereabouts of carryover and another f>70 billion of
current appropriations you have a potential of §140
billion that can be spent next year.
Under our past practice and custom we estimate that






#85 billion, just ae easily, if agencies decide to
spend much more next year and not carry over as much
to fiscal year 1961. But if you have a limitation on
the amount that they can spend next year, which this
[annual accrued expenditure] limitation places on that,
then you have R control on this budget when the
President says he estimates we will spend $77 billion.
Today you do not have that control. 22
It should be fully understood that the above justifica-
tion for placing limitations on annual accrued expenditures would
be valid only if all Government agencies were included, other-
wise planning the netional debt limit would, still be at best an
estimate. It is also emphasized that the above statement is
somewhat misleading in that, under Public Law 85-759, there -?re
four specific types of spending authorizations upon which limi-
tations could not be placed, and which, therefore, could not be
effectively controlled for the purposes of accurately predicting
the debt limit. * These authorizations comprised approximately
$10 billion of new obligational authority in fiscal year 1959.
Still, under limitations on annual accrued expendi-
tures, agencies cannot spend more than the amount inserted as
such. If the agencies "say they are going to carry over certain
amounts to the following year, they will have to carry over that
amount. They cannot change their minds and pay all that in
this year." 24
There were three particular objectives of including
the Coast Guard under the limitation experiment, as outlined by
22Ibid., p. 501.
23Supra , p. 69.
^House Subcommittee on Treasury-Post Office Departments
Appropriations, Hearings
. 1959, p. 501.
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the Assistant Secretary. The first objective was to eliminate
any argument "as to who thinks one thing or another. The Coast
Guard has the competence to demonstrate whether it is practicable
or not.
"
25 it has been shown that the accrued expenditure
concept had been accompanied almost from its inception with a
great amount of controversy.
The second objective that it was anticipated the Coast
Guard could show was that "the cost of this new procedure will
be nominal. The Coast Guard after a year of operation can tell
us whether it is a nominal cost or whether it is going to impose
a great deal of additional cost on this agency. °
Thirdly, and last, as an objective, was the hope that
"it will enable them to plan their projects and their activities
in a much better fashion. If that is not true then we (Treasury]
can knock that |the limitations! out." 2 ' Relative to this last
objective, the Commandant of the Coast Guard testified: "As
far as the efficiency of operation of the Coast Guard, we can
foresee at this point no Improvements from it.
"
Elimination by the Appropriations Committee
In the hearings on the I960 budget, the Chairman of the
Subcommittee on Treasury-Post Office Departments Appropriations
set the tone for the ultimate rejection and elimination of the
annual accrued expenditures limitations from the appropriations'
26.
aid., p. 501.
23Ibid .. p. 500. Ibid .
27;
28,House Subcommittee on Treasury-Post Office Departments
Appropriations, Hearings , i960, p. 570.
.
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language when he state "The original bill in ray judgment
would have cost us a great deal of nioney. The bill as it
sod jr. L. 85-751] ... 1 do not think will cost us aay
money unless we ro into some foolish operations with it. °
In reporting the I960 appropriations bills, the House
Committee on Appropriations did not include any of the six annual
accrued expenditure limitations re comicended by the President.
Several reasons were given in the report, including the follow-
ing:
The original concept and bill mandatorily would
have required use of the accrued expenditure technique
in appropriation bills. The enacted version and the
floor debate make it abundantly clear that its use in
appropriation bills 1b discretionary. In the case of
the Coast Guard, the testimony is conclusive that
—
1. Changes would have to be made in accounting,
reporting, and related procedures;
2. There would be added personnel and redtape
with resulting increased costs and no returns in
operating efficiency or economy.
Therefore, no useful purpose whatever was given the
committee to justify inclusion of the limitations in
the bill. 30
In referring specifically to the six appropriations for
which the limitations were recommended, the committee said:
"That same budget proposes that total appropriations in the six
instances be increased in the net amount of $5 million plus and
that expenditures be increased in the net amount of |16 million
plus over the current year. "3-*-
^House Subcommittee on Treasury-Post Office Departments
Appropriations, Hearings , 1959, p. 4-99.
^ U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations,
Treasury and Post Office Departments, and the Tax Court of the
United States Appropriations Bill, I960 . 86th Cong. , 1st Sess
.
,
1959, H. Rept. 227 to accompany H. R. 5805, P. 11.
31 Ibid ., p. 12.
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The committee's opinion was that "the facts are con-
clusive that this proposition is an absurdity and would not
save any money. . . ," J^
However, the Senate Committee on Appropriations restored
one of the Coast Guard limitations, on Acquisition, Construction,
and Improvement, and that appropriation was so passed by the
Senate. The Senate committee's report included the following
statements:
It is the sense of this committee that the application
of an annual accrued expenditure limitation to this
annual appropriation Operating expenses, Coast Guard]
is neither desirable nor advantageous and therefore,
concurs with the House in deleting the proviso. 33
Appropriations under this head Requisition, Construction,
and Improvement, Coast Guard] are authorized to remain
available until expended and therefore the committee
recommends application of an annual accrued expenditure
limitation of f'?0 million to this account to determine
any possible advantages or disadvantages. 3^
It is apparent that the Senate wished to provide at
least a token experimentation of the accrued expenditure method.
However, its wishes were nullified when that body receded from
its amendment described above, In conference, at the insistence
of the House Members. 35 Thus, no provisions for limitations on
32Ibid .
-^J. 3., Congress, cenate, Committee on Appropriations,
Treasury and Post Office Departments and Tax Court of the United
States Appropriation Bill. Fiscal Year 19^0 . 86th Cons.. 1st
Sess., 1959, S, Rent. 305 to accompany H. R. 5305, p. 6.
3A Ibid.
, p. 7.
U. S., Congress, Committee of Conference, Trea sury
and post Office Departments and Tax Court of the United States
Appropriations Bill, I960, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 1959, H. Rept.
425 to accompany H. R.~*5So5, p. 1.
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any appropriations were included in the i960 authorizations*
The President again, in his 1961 budget, recommended
that Congress place accrued expenditure limitations on 12
appropriations, exactly twice the number recommended the pre-
vious year. The Coast Guard OE and AC&I appropriations i-?ere
again included. Although the hearings again devoted considerable
discussion to the accrued expenditure procedure, none of the 12
limitations recommended in the budget were approved by the
House Appropriations Committee. In its report, the committee
gave no mention of, or reasons for, not including the recommended
limitations in the applicable appropriation bills. 3"
The 1962 Budget
In submitting the 1962 fiscal year budget, neither the
Coast Guard nor any other agencies were requested by the Bureau
of the Budget to include estimated limitations on annual accrued
expenditures. Thus, the "outlook for this feature of budgetary
reform is dim indeed. ;'^7 since the law which authorized the use
of the accrued expenditure principle expires April 1, 1962, it
is a certainty that by then there will have been no appropria-
tion to which the principle will have been applied for at least
one fiscal year.
It is noted that the most recent annual report of the
Joint Financial Management Improvement Program, while not
^U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations,
Treasury ana Post Office Departments, a nd the Tax Court of the
United Spate s Appropriations Bill. 1961 . 86th Cong., 2d Sess.,
19(50, H. Rept. 1281 to accompany H. R. 10569.
xiaurice H. Stans, "Current Improvements in Federal
Budgeting," The Journal of : ccountancy , May, 1959, p. 29.
••
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referring to the annual accrued c method in a lift of
the prog, ': ~'c objectives, did include the following
I
k. Establishment of cost-b.'-r- c budgeting practices
effectively integrated with the accounts to provide
adequate support for budget requests.
6. The use of consistent claaslf ications to bring about
effective coordination of agency programming, budgeting,
accounting, and reporting practices.
8. ffective integration of agency accounting and
reporting with the requirements of the budget process
find the central accounting and reporting of the Treasury
Department.
9. Development of accurate and useful agency and Govern-
ment-wide reports on fiscal status, financial results
of operations, and cost of agency performance of assigned
functions. 33
Summary
1though the road towards implementation of the accrued
expenditure principle appears at this point to be effectively
blocked, it seems reasonable to assume that a concept to which
was attached such a considerable, if not overwhelming, amount
of support, however emotional that support might have been,
will not be so soon abandoned.
™0* S., Secretary of the Treasury, Director, Bureau
of the Budget, and Comotroller General of the United States,
Annual Report, Fiscal Year I960. The Joint Financial Management
Improvement'~'program "T7asuington '* B. G. Government Printing




In earlier chapters, we have seen the development of
the accrued expenditure method, attempted to evaluate the
advantages and disadvantages, traced the enactment of legisla*
tion nroviding for limitations on annual accrued expenditures,
discussed means of implementation, and followed the actual
attempts toward consummation of the procedure in budgeting and
appropriating.
It is the purpose of this chapter to investigate the
other possible means of obtaining the only clesr advantage which
the accrued expenditure method supposedly would accomplish,
namely, improved facilities for review of executive agencies*
budget submissions for appropriation action by the Congress,
The future prospects of the accrued expenditure method are also
discussed insofar as they can be determined.
The Meed for Better "eview
If the Congress holds the 'power of the purse," then
it must pass on appropriations as a natural exercise of that
power. If the Congress is to control spending (expenditures,
disbursements), as well as pass on appropriations, then It must,





But, Congress does not now have available to its
proprlatloftt Committees a sufficient quantity of these details.
It doesn't "have access to nearly as much analytical data about
the budget as does the Executive. Although there is probably
oint beyond which additional information does not help to
predict consequences of action, Congress has not yet reached
that point." 2
Smithies eays; HAs a rule, the main source of informa-
tion about Executive performance is the appropriation Justifi-
cations. ... In all cases the primary objective of the depart-
ment is to justify its budget requests rather than to provide
a basis for a critical review of its performance."^
Members of Congress need detailed information and
analyses, --'nil ace says,
... to propose reductions Jn appropriations) based
on factual materials. Past experience has shown
that he Member of Congress] will not simply give up
his attempts to cut spending in absence of detailed
information. He seeks his only possible means of
achieving reductions—either blind cuts, or arbitrary A
restrictions which destroy administrative flexibility.
Although the imposition of limitations on annual accrued
expenditures may not clearly be an "arbitrary restriction," the
xRobert Ash Wallace, Congressional Control of Federal
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Arthur Smithies, rhe Budgetary Process in the
l York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1955), p. i5«.
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method does fall into the category of a restriction on admini-
strative flexibility. It must be assumed that the Congress
enacted accrued expenditure legislation in an effort to provide
means of reducing spending when such action is deemed necessary.
But the question, then, is, will other means of providing a
detailed and analytical review also tend to eliminate blind
cuts" and arbitrary restrictions?"
At present, although the executive budgets are formu-
lated and justified by thousands of different agency budget
officers, and then examined and coordinated by some 170 people in
the Bureau of the Budget, "this massive effort roust be compared
with twenty or thirty staff members of an Appropriation Commit-
tee who are fortunate if they can keep ur> even with the mecha-
nics of the bills, arranging hearings, drafting reports, and
comoiling comparative figures. "5
According to Smithies, "the budget should be compre-
hensible enough to be considered in the Congress by the whole
Appropriations Committee of the House as well as by the
specialized subcommittees. At present, it is so complicated
that only the small specialized groups can hope to understand
their respective parts of it."
The appropriation hearings, particularly in the
House, are, of course, largely concerned with what the
departments are doing and have done as well as with
what thoy propose to do. It is this very intermingling
of the present, the past, and the future that helps to
produce complexity and, to a large extent, the futility
of the appropriations hearings; and the subcommittees
do not get to the heart of the question of economy and
5 Ibid ., p. 173.
"Smithies, The Budgetary Process . . . . p. 169.
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efficiency by these methods. At the same time the need
to survey actual performance in conjunction with the
estimates for the future is one of the reasons why the
appropriations process is so inadequate from the viewpoint
of program consideration.
7
Even the subcommittee members of the Appropriations
Committees hsve to depend upon the staff experts to "guide them
through the maze of legislative language. ,1
°
"ftie committees are more or less at the mercy
of the departments." (Senator Allen] tllender srys.
Ifaey can send in their Justifications, and we can
take them and read them. It takes me a week to read
the agriculture bill alone. I don't have that much
time. And the committee doesn't have enough investigators
to to behind all the requests and see whether they are
really needed."
9
How, then, can the content and format of the Executive
budget be adapted to assist the Congress in its difficult task
of review? Wallace maintains that Congress needs objective
expenditures analyses to help it form an independent Judgment
on appropriations matters. Smithies says Congress "must have
cost information of a more significant kind than an agglomeration
of detail. The review process can yield information on the
actual cost of execution of programs. . . . Such information
is contained within the cost-based budget.
7lbid., vv- 153-54.
''How Purse Strings Are Controlled,' Business Yteek
.
February 9, 1957, p. 142.
9 Ibid.
Wallace, Congress ional Control . . . , p. 172.




The cost-based budget, In conjunction with accrual
accounting, was enacted as an objective for government budgeting
and accounting by Public Law 84-863.
^
2 It is not the purpose of
thie "a per to explore in any detail the cost budgeting concept.
The following discussion merely attempts to show that the review
benefits and advantages attributed to the accrued expenditure
procedure c c n likewise be obtained from implementation of the
cost-based budget, without necessarily resorting to the
restrictions on executive flexibility imposed by limitations on
annual accrued expenditures.
The following analysis of budget review points out the
cost-based budget technique:
It seems reasonable to conclude that the best
basic approach to a review of the budget is one which
provides for (1) consideration of a proposed work plan
or program to be accomplished, (2) what was accomplished
in preceding periods and (3) costs for both in terms of
total resources consumed. ith this point of departure
the budget can then be assessed in terms of (a) costs
to be incurred, (b) resources already available in terms
of inventories, etc., plus carried-over funds, and (c)
new money or authority needed. 13
Although complete implementation of presentation of
budgets on cost-basis will take several more years, approxi-
mately two-thirds of the appropriation items in the fiscal year
12Suora, Chap. III.
1^
"'U. £., Congress, House, subcommittee of the Committee
on Government Operations, Hearings, Bills to Improve govern-






1962 budget were prepared in such a manner.
It is emphasized that the use of the accrued expenditure
baee of appropriating is not essential to the use of accrual
accounting and cost-based budge tip- . In fact, as has been shown
before, the obligation base of appropriating was retained when
legislation which enacted the accrued expenditure method 1
eventually passed (P. L. 35-759). ^is was not entirely in
accordance with the Second Hoover Commission's recommendation,
which contemplated that the appropriating base be changed to
conform to accrue? expenditure principle.
In other words, it would be entirely practicable to
employ cost-based budgeting techniques under both the obligation
and accrued expenditures bises of appropriating, and still reap
the benefits of the cost budge t approach.
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), while
agreeing that it has been true in the past that inadequate
attention has been paid to costs, stated that "it is possible
to budget for both obligations and costs within the ^resent
basis of appropriations in terms of obligational authority. "**
A principal advantage of budgeting on a cost basis
"is that management and the Congress are able to review the
total resources on hand, on order, and to be procured rather
14
U. S. , Secretary of the Treasury, Director, Bureau
of the Budget, and Comptroller General of the United States,
Annual Report, Fiscal Year I960, The Joint Financial Management
Improvement Program (Washington: U. S. Government Printing
Office, I960), p. 6.
1
^Iiouse Committee on Government Operations, Bills to
Improve . . . . Hearings, 1956, p. 148.
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than limiting the budget review process to new money in the form
of obliga tional authority. The cost- type budget 'shows the
obligating authority required to place orders for additional
goo d services seeded to accomplish the planned program and
saintain the resources on hand at a level appropriate to the
agency's Operating requirements.' '
en inventories and long lead-time programs are involv-
ed, the cost-based budget provides "its greatest benefit because
of the identification of carryovers of available resources from
one fear to another.' This type of budget is derived from
the accrual basis of accounting, which identifies the carryover
of resources in relation to the time period involved, "in all
cases, accounting on an accrual and cost basis must be integrated
with such other accounting records as are needed to provide for




The Assistant to the Comptroller General stated that,
even though it raay not be possible to estimate exactly what
long lead-time procurement items will eventually cost, from
the drawing board presentation, it is et the point where the
item is approximately one year from being delivered that the
cost based budget will give both the management and the Congress
U. C, Congress, Senate, Committee on Government
Operations, Financial Management in the Federal Government
.
86th Cong., 2d SesE., 1960 ( " a shin^ton : U. ST" Government
Printing Office, 1961), p. §5*
17Ibld., p. 96. l8 Ibld .
19Ibld .. p. 97.
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a great deal of information." 20 Thus, this information would be
extremely useful for Congress in its review function which
precedes budget authorization.
The Future for the Accrued Expenditure Method
Because there were no limitations on annual accrued
expenditures submitted in the 1962 President's budget, and the
legislation authorizing submissions under this procedure will
expire on April 1, 1962, it is reasonable to assume that,
unless some positive actiou is undertaken during calendar year
1961, towards implementation of the principle, that it probably
will lapse according to schedule.
At the date of this writing, there is no official in-
tention on the part of the Director, Bureau of the Budget, to
request any proposed limitations to be submitted within the
1963 budget. 2* Neither is there any proposed or pending legis-
lation to provide for renewal or extension of Public Law 85-759
so that it would not lapse on April 1, 1962. ^
At the very most, one can only speculate that President
Kennedy, an active sponsor of the accrued expenditure method
20
House Committee on Government Operations, Bills to
Improve . « . . Hearings , 1956, p. 53.
21
Interview with Harry T. Quirk and James E. Scott,
Examiners, Bureau of the Budget, April 6, 1961.
22Telephone conversation with l-lmer W. Henderson,
Counsel, Subcommittee on Executive and Legislative Reorganization
of the Committee on Government Operations, U. S. House of
Representatives, April 5, 1961.
.
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while a Member of the Senate, might seek to renew attempts to
implement the accrued expenditure procedure for experimental
purposes. To date, there has been nothing to indicate this
might "be so.
Summary
After an extremely controversial and lengthy road to
eventual enactment into law, it appears the annual accrued
exoenditure principle will, on April 1, 1962, cease to be
authorized, and lapse into solitude, never hevlng been completely
tested as a part of the Federal government budget and appropriat-
ing structure.
However futile the attempts toward ultimate implementa-
tion of the concept might have been, they might not have been
wasted effort, because of the attention the controversy surround-
ing the accrued expenditure method focused on the accounting,
budgeting, and appropriating systems.
Although, unless the method is ever put into use, it
will not be known which of its claimed advantages were, in
effect, valid, it seems reasonable to assume that the only
benefit which the method would have provided without some
coincident disadvantages would have been better review of the
budget proposals by the Congress as a part of the budget authori-
zation process. It is likely that this review advantage will
ultimately be as well achieved by complete change to the cost-
based budget.
Whether or not the method is left to 'die" or is ever
again considered for enactment into legislation would seem to
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depend upon the success achieved by the Congress in obtaining
the information it requires for a satisfactory review of
executive spending by means of a complete and effective system
of accrual accounting and cost-based budgeting.

APPENDIX A
PUBLIC LAW 759, 85TH CONGRESS
Public Law 85-759 (72 Stat. 852, 853), approved
August 25 , 1958, added the following subsections to Title II
—
The Budget of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 (42 Stat,
20)
Sec. 201. (b) IVhenever the President determines
there has been established a satisfactory system of accrual
accounting for an appropriation or fund account, each
proposed appropriation thereafter transmitted to the Congress
for such account pursuant to the provisions of this Act shall
be accompanied by a proposed limitation on annual accrued
expenditures. The President may include in the Budget with
any such proposed limitation on annual accrued expenditures,
proposals for provisions authorizing the head of a depart-
ment or establishment to make transfers, within his depart-
ment or establishment, between such limitations on annual
accrued expenditures; and such provisions may limit by
amount or by per centum the size of any transfers so
prooosed.
(c) Whenever an appropriation is subject to a limitation
on annual accrued expenditures, there shall be charged
against the limitation the cost of goods and services and
other assets received, advance payments made and progress
payments becoming due, and the amount of any other liabi-
lities becoming payable, during the fiscal year concerned.
(d) At the end of the fiscal year concerned, any unused
balance of the limitation on annual accrued expenditures
shall lapse, except that whenever any liabilities are
incurred within the limitation provided for in any fiscal
year (whether or not recorded or reported in such fiscal
year), nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent
the making of payment therefor in any subsequent fiscal year
(e) Any obligations incurred during the fiscal year
concerned or in prior fiscal years which do not result in
liabilities becoming payable during the fiscal year concerned
shall be charged against the limitation on annual accrued
expenditures for any succeeding fiscal year in which such
obligations may result in liabilities becoming payable.
(f) Nothing in subsections (b) through (e) of this
section shall be construed to change existing law with
respect to the method or manner of making appropriations




Public lav; 85-759 further provides:
ciec. 2. (a) It shall be in order to provide in any
bill or joint resolution making appropriations, or in any
amendment thereto, limitations on annual accrued expendi-
tures covering amounts becoming payable as a result of
obligations incurred both in the fiscal year concerned ~nd
in prior fiscal years, and to include in any such bill or
joint resolution provisions authorizing the head of a
department or establishment to make transfers, within his
department or establishment, between such limitations on
annual accrued expenditures; and such provisions may limit
by amount or by per centum the size of ?ny transfer so
provided for.
(b) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section
are enacted by the Congress
—
(1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the
-enate and the House of Representatives, respectively, and
as such they shall be considered as part of the rules of
each House, respectively, or of that House to which they
specifically apply; and such rules shall supersede other
rules only to the extent that they are inconsistent
therewith; and
(2) with full recognition of the Constitutional
right of either House to change rules (so far as relating
to~the procedure in such House) at any time, in the same
manner and to the same extent as in the case of any other
rule of such House.
Sec. 3. This Act, and the amendments made thereby
shall cease to be in effect April 1, 1962.

APPENDIX B
MATHEMATICAL DETSRMI NATION OF WHAT CONSTITUTES
ANNUAL ACCRUED EXPENDITURES
The following was taken from Deputy Chief of Staff,
U. S. Coast Guard Memorandum to Chiefs, Offices and Divisions
of 11 December 1959, FB Ll-1
:
4. ' ccrued expenditures" may be defined as the value
of goods and services received in a fiscal period (whether
or not payment has been made) plus advance payments for
goods and services to be delivered in a future period. To
relate this definition to "obligation", let us consider
what happens when we obligate money for an inventory
purchase. When the purchase order is written, the obliga-
tion is recorded ag an "undelivered order". When the
material is received, the obligation changes from an
"undelivered order to an "Inventory asset' as the item
Is placed on the shelf". When the inventory item Is
issued for use, the obligation again changes; this time it
is listed as a "cost". Thus an obligation may be either
an "undelivered order , an "inventory asset", or a "cost .
In some cases, such as when orders are placed with the
feoast Guard] Yard or progress payments are made to contractors,
funds are paid in advance of the receipt of goods or services.
This, of course, also requires an obligation of funds, but
in these cases, the obligation is recorded as on "advance".
There is still one other way in which an obligation may be
recorded . . . "work-in-procesF . "Work- in-nro cess" represents
the value of labor, materials and overhead that is invested
in an incompleted work order being carried out by ft Coast
G-uard Indus trial unit.
5. So, an obligation is either an undelivered order",
an "inventory asset , a 'cost", an "advance", or 'work-in-
process' 1 , Therefore, funds obligated during a year may
result In increasing the value of any or all of these
accounts. The next question is, ''Which of these obliga-
tion accounts represent what we call accrued expenditures?"
By definition, "accrued expenditures" represent the value
of goods and services re ceived in a fiscal period whether
or not payment has been made plus advance payments for goods
and services to be delivered in a future neriod. They




(goods received and issued for use), increases in
outstanding advances (payments ) , and inn b in work-in-
process (materials received and used, labor received , etc.).
In effect, then, the only type of obligation which is not
an accrued expenditure is undelivered orders. Consequently,
we may state mathematically that the accrued expenditures
for a given year equal the total obligations placed in
that year minus the algebraic change in undelivered orders
during that year, or:
(1) Accrued expenditures = obligations - change in
undelivered orders
Since the change in undelivered orders is equivalent to
the undelivered orders (UOS) at the end of the year less
the undelivered orders at the beginning of the year (UOB),
our equation m&f be expressed asT
(2) Accrued, expenditures ~ obligations - U03 + UOB
For example, the AC&I budgat for 1961 (Allowance Stage)
shows estimated obligation of l31.ll7 ; undelivered orders
at the beginning of 1961 ara estimated to be %12Al while
at the end of the year they ?re estimated to be |19*4&,
therefore the accrued expenditures for 1961 are determined
to be:
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